THOMAS P. JOSEPH, J. –

1. Petitioner filed M.C.No.106 of 2009 in the court of learned Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Mavelikkara under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (for short, "the Act"). While so, petitioner filed Ext.P3, petition for amendment to incorporate reliefs under Sec.19 of the Act and for awarding monthly allowance to her by way of maintenance. That petition was opposed by the respondents on various grounds including that there is no provision for amendment of the petition provided under the Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, "the Code") and that petition for amendment is only a counter blast for a prosecution that second respondent, mother-in-law of petitioner has launched against petitioner for forging her certificates. Learned Magistrate was not inclined to allow the prayer of petitioner and dismissed the petition as per Ext.P3, order dated December 13, 2010. That order is under challenge. Learned counsel for petitioner contends that proceeding before learned Magistrate under the Act is quasi civil in nature and hence it is within the power of learned Magistrate to allow amendment in appropriate cases. Learned counsel contended that it was by a mistake that petitioner omitted to claim relief under Sec.19 of the Act and for maintenance. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Raosahed P.Kamble v. Shaila Raosahed Kamble (2010 [4] KLT 331). Learned counsel for respondents per contra contended that the procedure which learned Magistrate has to follow is laid down in Sec.28 of the Act as one under the Code and in the circumstances question of allowing amendment by the Criminal Court does not arise. It is also contended that it is after the evidence of petitioner was recorded and it was posted for evidence of respondents that the petition came, that too after the second respondent had initiated prosecution against petitioner. It is contended by learned counsel that though relief under Sec.19 of the Act is sought to be incorporated by amendment, there is no mention about that in the affidavit of petitioner. In the circumstances there is no reason to interfere with the order under challenge, it is argued.

2. No doubt, the Act confers jurisdiction on the Magistrate to grant reliefs referred to therein and the expression "Magistrate" is defined in Sec.2(i) of the Act as meaning the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the area where the aggrieved person resides temporarily or otherwise or the respondent resides or the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place. Having regard to the relevant provisions of the Act including Sec.29 which provides an appeal to the court of Sessions from the order passed by the Magistrate though it is possible to say that the Magistrate functions as a Criminal Court, question arises as to whether proceedings before the Magistrate while exercising functions under the Act are Criminal or Civil in nature. The consistent view taken is that proceedings before the Magistrate and reliefs (except for punishment) provided under the Act are of a civil nature nature. Authority for that proposition is contained in the decisions in Dr.Perceline George v. State of Kerala (2010 [1] KHC 417) and Vijayalekshmi Amma v. Bindu (2010 [1] KHC 57). It has been held that proceedings before the Magistrate are of a civil nature. In Dr.Perceline George v. State of Kerala (supra) it has also been held that service of notice on an application under Sec.12 or interim relief under Sec.23 of the Act has to be in the manner provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. Certainly it is because proceedings before the Magistrate are of a civil nature. That exactly is what the Bombay High Court also has stated in Raosahed P.Kamble v. Shaila Raosahed Kamble (supra). There, it was held that proceedings un