BASANT, J.

1. Should negligence be proved invariably in all claims for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act? What is the quality of negligence to be proved and the extent of proof required? These questions arise for consideration in this appeal.

2. Insurer is the appellant. The insurer assails the award of the Tribunal directing payment of an amount of Rs.2,53,700/- to the claimant who is the mother of the deceased. The deceased was a passenger in a vehicle insured with the appellant. While the vehicle was being driven, it is alleged that the deceased made some movements inside the jeep. The door of the jeep opened and he was consequently thrown outside the jeep. This is the alleged incident.

3. The Tribunal even in the absence of any better evidence came to the conclusion that the owner, driver and insurer of the vehicle are liable to compensate the claimants. No specific finding on the question of negligence was entered.

4. The insurer assails the impugned award on the short ground that the Tribunal erred in directing payment of amounts under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act in the absence of a specific finding about negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the vehicle. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company argues that even today the foundation of liability under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act must be traced under the Law of Torts. Negligence is the foundation of liability and Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides only an expeditious and inexpensive forum and method to claim compensation.

5. We are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant on that question of law. The foundation of liability is still negligence. The liability sought to be enforced under Section 166 is again founded on the Law of Torts. In these circumstances in the absence of satisfaction entertained in the mind of the court about the existence of negligence, the direction for payment of compensation cannot obviously be justified.

6. But the quality of negligence which a claimant is to establish in proceedings under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is certainly inferior. We cannot afford to forget or ignore that we are living in the post Section 140/163 A era and insistence on proof of negligence must be realistically understood. Culpable negligence need not be proved. It is enough if the court is satisfied about the existence of negligence. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1861-1873 All.E.RI.) will certainly apply. The doctrine of res ipsa locquitur will also apply. Consequently, a Tribunal should not ritualistically insist on oral evidence to prove negligence. It is sufficient that negligence on the part of the driver or owner is established from the totality of circumstances. Reliance is placed on the dictum in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. (2001 (1) KLT 408 (SC)). That was a case where one of the wheels of the vehicles gave way and an accident occurred and the Supreme Court took the view that the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1861-1873 All.E.RI.)would apply. It is certainly not the law emanating from that judgment that negligence need not be proved at all in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that negligence has to be proved.7. In this context we feel it appropriate to refer to the practice adopted by many Tribunals in the State. Wherever a crime has been registered in respect of the accident and the investigation has culminated in the filing of a charge sheet by the police, such charge sheet is filed and the same is reckoned as sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the indictee. The practice has not received formal judicial approval and hence some Tribunals insist on oral evidence in support of negligence invariably. This consumes a lot of judicial time and the heavily over worked Tribunal spends its time on unnecessary oral evidence of negligence. We would certainly