1. Petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S.No.36 of 1993 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam. The above suit is stated to be one for recovery of possession of certain trust properties, whereunder the plaintiff as the de facto trustee and also as a beneficiary claimed that relief alleging that the 1st defendant, the de-jure trustee, was acting against the interests of the trust, and, thus, incompetent to represent the suit. That suit was dismissed upholding the challenges raised by the contesting defendants impeaching its maintainability and also the competency of the plaintiff to sue for the reliefs canvassed for. As against the decree of dismissal, petitioner/plaintiff preferred and appeal, A.S.No.14 of 2002 on the file of the Additional District Court, Mavelikkara. The appeal was dismissed as stated in paragraph 9 of the original petition with the following order:-

“…The appellants counsel reported no instruction vide endorsement on the vakalath. The appellant is called and found absent. Appeal is hereby dismissed. No cost….”

After dismissal of the appeal as stated above, petitioner moved an application for its restoration under Order XLI Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for short, the ‘Code’ with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 334 days in seeking restoration. Ext.P1 is the copy of the petition filed to re-admit the appeal and Ext.P2, the petition for condonation of delay. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed Ext.P2 petition for condonation of delay vide Ext.P3 order. Propriety, legality and correctness of Ext.P3 order is assailed in this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction vested with this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. The learned counsel on queried whether the order rejecting the petition for restoration consequent to passing of Ext.P3 order turning down the application for condonation of delay is not open to an appeal as under Order XLIII Rule 1(a) of the Code it is submitted that such appeal can be preferred only where the order has been passed on the restoration petition and not when it is a case of rejection of that application on dismissal of the application moved for condonation of the delay. I cannot agree with the aforesaid submission of the counsel. Where an application for restoration of an appeal dismissed for default is belated, necessarily, the delay has to be explained. For doing so, it is not a must that the applicant should file a separate petition seeking condonation of delay. The applicant can very well state the reasons showing sufficient cause for condonation in the very same petition moved for in the affidavit filed in support of the application for restoration itself and seek condonation of such delay in such petition as under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. A combined petition supported by one affidavit of the applicant as under Order XLI Rule 19 of the Code and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is sufficient for considering whether any ground has been made out for condonation of delay and also restoration of the appeal. Procedure is the handmaid of justice and it is intended to advance and not to stultify justice. Merely because the petitioner has filed a separate petition seeking condonation of delay when she moved an application for restoration of the appeal dismissed for default, consequent to dismissal of her application for condonation, which, no doubt, would in turn result in rejection of her application for restoration, by impeaching the correctness of the order dismissing her application for condonation, that alone, in whatever be the course adopted, she cannot get the order of rejection of the restoration application annulled and set aside. That order passed on rejection even if it was passed on the dismissal of the application for condonation, if not so challenged shall remain intact and inviolable. So much so, the order of rejection of the application for restor