The main legal point established is the duty of authorities to initiate prosecutions when offences under the Act are disclosed, and the court's power to provide procedures necessary for operationalizing statutory provisions.

Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan, J.

1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Director General of Prosecutions.

2. Examining the statutory provisions as contained in the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001, for short, the "Act", in the backdrop of decisions rendered by this Court touching different aspects of that Act, we see that the learned Judge, in making the order of reference, was justified in stating that the situation in hand needs further consideration because, in the ultimate analysis, it is also the requirement that section 20 of the Act is effectively implemented.

3. Section 20 of the Act provides the penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Section 21 provides the penalty for abetment of any offence punishable under the Act. Taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act stands governed by sections 24 and 25. Statutory provisions authorizing various actions in terms of the provisions of the Act, either by the revenue authorities or by the criminal courts, have been dealt with, quite elaborately, in different decisions; Abdul Samad v. State of Kerala[2007 (4) KLT 473], Moosakoya v. State of Kerala[2008 (1) KLT 538], Ahammed Kutty v. State of Kerala [2008 (1) KLT 1068], Shoukathali v. Tahsildar [2009 (1) KLT 640] and few others as well. Examining them, we do not find any conflict among those precedents on any issue relating to Sections 20, 21, 22, 24 or 25 of the Act.

4. We also need to note that section 22 of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law, for the time being in force, for any act or omission made punishable under the Act. This means that if the act or omission resulting in the violation of sections 20, 21 or 22 of the Act also amounts to an offence punishable under any other law, including the Indian Penal Code, the law will take its due course and the provisions as to the taking of cognizance would not then be controlled by sections 24 and 25 of the Act in so far as the criminal proceedings are relatable to the allegation as to commission of such other offences, as may be made out. Ignoring section 22, while construing sections 20, 21, 24 and 25, would be counterproductive to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act.

5.The Act was brought in to protect river banks and river beds from large scale dredging of river sand and to protect their biophysical environment system and to regulate the removal of river sand and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The preamble to the Act, which was referred to in the precedents noted above, pointedly shows that the ultimate object sought to be achieved and the requirement that ought not to fail is to provide regulatory measures as part of environment management.

6. An examination of the provisions of the Act, with the aforesaid in mind, would show that there is abundant room for mischief and subversion of the objects sought to be achieved by that Act, including the clear expressions in its preamble. Such abuse would only shield the offenders who plunder natural resources for commercial gain, in defiance of the laws. If not curtailed, such abuse would essentially be against the interest of national wealth and, in turn, against national interest. We have no doubt that the ill-crafted legislation cripples public and national interests. It cannot contain the onslaughts on nature. It does not provide to preserve the Earth, Her waters etc. for the generations who are in the waiting, yet to be born for a sojourn on this planet. It does not prevent Her rape for wealth. Laws made by man shall not be as eye-wash; if he lets them to be so, even the eyes would be washed off; if not his, but surely; those who may run with him or, may be, those yet to tread. The substance of the order of reference is not a criticism of the views taken in the judgments referred to ther