R. Basant, J.

i) In a criminal case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, is the prosecution bound to prove the circumstances beyond doubt?

ii) Is it sufficient that the circumstances are proved by the prosecution on the test of balance of probabilities as in a civil case?

iii) Is the burden on the prosecution in a criminal case to prove guilt beyond doubt confined only to proof of inferential facts and not to primary or basic facts?

iv) Can the insistence on proof beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case be justified by the definition of the expression "proved" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act? Is such insistence alien to such definition and justified (or imported into Indian Criminal Law) only by binding precedents of superior courts?

v) Does not the definition of the expression "proved" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act (the Act hereinafter) apply to all facts -facts in issue and relevant facts, whether sought to be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence?

vi) Do the observations of the Constitution Bench in para. 18 of M.G. Agarwal Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 negate or obliterate altogether the distinction between proof of circumstances in a civil trial and criminal trial? If not, why and under what circumstances were those observations made in M.G. Agarwal (supra) by their Lordships?

vii) What is the ordinary way of judging evidence referred to in para. 18 of M.G. Agarwal (supra)? By those observations did their Lordships of the Constitution Bench refuse to recognise and accept the classic and well entrenched distinction in the Indo Anglo Saxon jurisprudence between appreciation of evidence in a civil case and a criminal case?

2. These interesting questions of law are raised for consideration in the course of discussions at the Bar in this appeal. The questions were raised by Advocate Blaze K.Jose, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The counsel submitted that a lot of doubts and confusion do exist in the minds of grassroot level functionaries in the criminal justice delivery system and the earlier the same is clarified, the better it shall be for the system. Sri Blaze submitted that these questions are of crucial relevance in the facts of this case as he wants to advance an argument that the circumstances relied on by the prosecution have not been proved beyond doubt. According to him, every circumstance relied on by the prosecution has got to be proved beyond doubt in a criminal case to enable the court to reckon the same as a legally cognisable circumstance. Half baked proof of circumstances (meaning thereby proof of circumstances by balance of probabilities as in a civil case) is insufficient in a criminal trial and proof to the hilt - by the onerous standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, is essential before any circumstance can be taken cognizance of by a criminal court in the adjudication of guilt, argues the learned counsel.

3. Sri. Blaze points out the scholarly opinion (with which he respectfully disagrees) of Hon' ble Justice U.L. Bhatt, the former Acting Chief Justice of this Court, former Chief Justice of the Guwahati and Madhya Pradesh High Courts, Honorary Professor of the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal and a great jurist of our times on the manner in which M.G. Agarwal (supra) is to be understood and applied. He submits that in the light of such opinion, the position deserves to be clarified. We found the questions to be interesting. We solicited assistance from the Bar. Whoever was willing to contribute to the thought on the subject in the course of the discussions at the Bar was given an opportunity to be heard. We place on record our appreciation for the competent assistance from the members of the Bar including senior advocates Sri. M.K. Damodaran, B. Raman Pillai, S. Sreekumar, P. Vijaya Bhanu and Director General of Prosecution Sri Asif Ali. We do particularly record our appreciation and gratitude for the inspired assistance and res