Shamsuddin J. - This Civil Revision Petition came before us on a reference made by Thomas J. To appreciate the legal questions raised in the C.R.P. it is necessary to briefly state the facts.

O.P. (Arbitration) No. 7/79 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Thodupuzha was filed by the 1st respondent herein seeking to pass a decree in accordance with an arbitration award dated 5-5-1979. The case of the 1st respondent was that he and the petitioner herein entered into a partnership agreement for starting a rice mill, that the said business ceased to function from November, 1976 onwards, that thereafter he had applied to the local S.N.D.P. office bearers to arbitrate the dispute between him and the petitioner and accordingly the S.N.D.P. Office-bearers arbitrated the matter and passed an award 5-5-1979.

While the O.P. was pending, the petitioner filed I.A. No. 1331 of 1981 on 3-11-1981 praying to declared that the award was a nullity as there was no valid agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration. The respondents filed objection to the I.A. raising the contention that the application was barred by limitation since it was not filed within 30 days from the date of filing the award in Court. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld the objection and help that I.A. No. 1331 of 1981 was barred by limitation and accordingly the I.A. was dismissed with costs. That order is now challenged in this Civil Revision Petition.

A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that since an appeal is provided under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, no revisional jurisdiction can be exercised in view of the bar contained in Section 115(2) of the C.P.C. According to the learned counsel, an appeal would lie under Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act against the order challenge since against the order refusing to set aside the award an appeal is maintainable under Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act.

The learned counsel for the revision petitioner ventured to meet this preliminary objection contending that the impugned order is not an order coming within the purview of Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. According to him, the rejection of the petition on the ground that it was barred by limitation will not amount to a refusal to set aside the award within the meaning of Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act.

Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which deals with the grounds for setting aside the award, reads as follows :

"30. Any award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely."

(a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings;

(b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35;

(c) that an award has been improperly procured or other is invalid.

Section 32 of the Act lays down as follows :

"32. Bar to suit contesting arbitration agreement or award Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force no suit shall lie on any ground, whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award, be enforced, set aside, amended modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act".

Section 33 of the Act provides that any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits. Proviso to the said section further lays down that where the court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.

Article 119 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 provides a period of 30 days from the date of ser