Corroboration in rape cases is a matter of prudence, not a legal requirement, and must render the victim's story probable and reasonably connect the accused with the crime. The definitions of 'intercourse' and 'penetration' in the context of unnatural offences under S. 377 of the Penal Code were also clarified.

These appeals arise out of two Sessions Cases disposed of by the Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Kasargod. The Assistant Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents, each of whom was the accused parson in each of the Sessions Cages. The charge against them was that they committed rape on P.W. 1 (Narayani) aged fourteen on 25th June 1966 at about 5.30 p.m. one after the other at the house of the respondent in the second of these appeals (Kunhikaanan alias Kannau Nair). The case was that P.W. 1, a dhobi girl, took washed clothes to the house of Kannan Nair, while the respondent in the first of these appeals (Govindan alias Govindan Hair) was also present; that they took the girl forcibly inside the house of Kannan Nair and laid her on a gunny spread on the ground; and that they committed rape on her one after the other. P.W. 1 returned home weeping; but did not disclose the incident to her mother, P.W. 2. She became unwell; and her mother suspecting something wrong with the daughter, persistently questioned her. The girl ultimately disclosed the incident to her mother on 27th June; and the mother took the girl to the police station and the latter gave a complaint to the police (Ex. P-1) on 28th June.

2. The respondents denied the offence; and Govindan Nair said further that he gave Rs. 2/- to P.W. 1 for purchasing rice and she promised to give him sugar for the amount; that she failed to return the money or to give sugar; that he questioned her at the market place regarding the matter and a small crowd collected there : and that on this score P.W. 1 bore enmity towards him. Kannan Nair did not allege any enmity on the part of P.W. 1. I may also mention that neither of the respondents alleged any enmity towards them on the part of P.W. 2.

3. The Assistant Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents giving them the benefit of doubt. The main reasoning of the Assistant Sessions Judge is that the evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape case (P.W. 1 in these cases) cannot be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The Assistant Sessions Judge also arise that P.W. 1 had no case at the stage of the complaint that there was penetration and that the case of penetration was an afterthought. Again, he points out some discrepancies in the evidence of P.W. 1, which also have assisted him in reaching the aforesaid conclusion.

4. The State has filed these appeals against the acquittal of the respondents; and the Public Prosecutor contends that the conclusion of the Assistant Sessions Judge is wrong.

5. The judgements of the Assistant Sessions Judge are grievously erroneous. They appear to be merely an attempt to pick holes in the prosecution case good, bad, indifferent. The gravest error committed by him appears in the following sentence in his judgements :

''Authorities are clear that the evidence of the prosecutrix requires strict corroboration in material particulars."

The authorities on the question do not lay down anything like this. I shall extract a little copiously from two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first is Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54, wherein Bose, J., who spoke for the Court, observes :

"The rule, which according to the cages has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the Judge, and in jury cases, must find place in the before a conviction without corroboration can be sustained. The tender years of the child, coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case, such for example, as its demeanour unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary : but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the Judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and ap