ORDER :- The trial court appointed the 2nd defendant and another as receivers pending O.S. No. 173 of 1959 on its file. On appeal and cross-appeal by the parties the lower appellate court set aside that order and granted a temporary injunction as prayed for in the plaint. The 2nd defendant has come up in revision questioning the jurisdiction of the lower courts to pass any interim order at all. When the case came up before me on a previous occasion, the learned counsel on both sides agreed that the question regarding jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the suit itself might be decided as a preliminary issue before the Civil Revision Petition was taken up for hearing. Therefore, I directed the trial court to submit a finding regarding its jurisdiction to try the suit itself; and the trial court has now submitted a finding that the suit falls beyond the scope of Sec. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore it has jurisdiction to try it. The correctness of this finding is challenged before me as a preliminary to the hearing of the Civil Revision Petition itself.

2. Four parishioners of the Kadeesa Church at Kayamkulam filed the suit in their individual capacity and representing the other parishioners and also on behalf of the Church itself. In the plaint they alleged that the Church was bound by a trust in favour of the Jacobite Syrian Community subject to the spiritual supremacy of the Patriarch of Antioch. Defendants 1 to 15 were elected as a Committee to manage the affairs of the church at a meeting held on 15th March 1959. The validity of this meeting and the authority of defendants 1 to 15 to manage the affairs of the church are questioned by the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, the church was being managed by a validly constituted committee consisting of defendants 1, 9 and 22 to 26 under an earlier order of 10th August 1958 issued by the 21st defendant, who was the Metropolitan. On these allegations the plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that the meeting of i5th March 1959 and the proceedings of that meeting were invalid; for restraining defendants 2 to 20 and others belonging to their party from interfering with the administration of the church; and also for the appointment of a receiver for collecting the income and producing it in court. There was also a prayer for framing a scheme for the management of the Church. The temporary injunction was granted pending the above suit with the aforesaid prayers.

3. The main contention of the defendants was that the Church was a public charitable trust and that the suit was hit by Sec. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure as there was a prayer for framing a scheme. On that ground the contesting defendants prayed that the suit might be dismissed, as it was not presented in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, nor was it filed with the consent of the Advocate General. The written statement was filed after I called for the finding from the trial court. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed a replication, in which they alleged that the church was not a public trust and that they did not press the prayer for framing the scheme. After considering the aforesaid relevant allegations in the pleadings, the learned Munsif has submitted the finding already referred to.

4. Mr. D. A. Krishna Variar, the learned advocate of the petitioner, contends that the suit as originally filed was one coming within the mischief of Sec. 92; and therefore the subsequent withdrawal of one prayer would not save the suit. He urges further that, in a suit coming within S. 92 (1) with other prayers as well, which do not come within sub-clauses (a) to (h) in Sec. 92 (1), if there is one prayer coming within any of those sub-clauses, the whole suit has to be dismissed; and the court would not be justified in refusing the offending prayer alone and granting the other prayers. For these propositions he relies on Abdur Rahim v. Abu Mahomed Barkat Ali, AIR 1928 PC 16; Narsidas Jekisondas v. R

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