1. Has the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) the jurisdiction to grant an order of stay ex-parte of the proceedings impugned in a revision petition under S.90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the ‘Act’ for short)? I find that a discordant note has been struck by a learned single Judge of this Court which however militates against the binding precedent of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on the point.

2. The petitioner challenges the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority settling the time schedule for the second respondent to operate his Stage Carriage service on the route Ranni-Pathanamthitta. The petitioner contends that there was no necessity to alter the time schedule when the same had been settled by the Regional Transport Authority hardly nine months ago. Reliance is placed on R.212 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (the ‘Rules’ for short) to urge that there was no change of circumstance in the interregnum warranting the alteration of the time schedule. The petitioner does concede that the propriety of convening such a timing conference and altering the time schedule could be scrutinised by the Tribunal in a revision petition under S.90 of the Act. But the petitioner laments that the Tribunal is powerless to grant an order of stay ex parte in view of the decision in Johnson v. Regional Transport Authority, Vadakara (2006 (2) KLT 1016). It is the case of the petitioner that a revisional jurisdiction sans the power to grant an order of stay ex parte is not so effective as to deny the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner points out that the second respondent may even evade notice and it would be impossible for the Tribunal to consider the interim application for stay in the revision petition soon. The petitioner thus justifies the invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority. The second respondent on the other hand asserts that the necessity to convene a timing conference in a short interval and allot a time schedule can be better adjudicated in a revision petition. The second respondent adds that only a time schedule hitherto lying vacant was allotted to him and the Tribunal is well competent to decide that issue in a revision petition.

3. I Heard Mr. O.D. Sivadas, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. P.M. Saneer, Advocate on behalf of the first respondent and Mr. Stalin Peter Davis, Advocate on behalf of the second respondent. I also had the advantage of hearing Mr. P. Deepak, Advocate as amicus curiae in this Writ Petition who made a copious reference to the various decisions of this Court and the Apex Court on the issue.

4. A close comparison of S.64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as it stood before amendment and S.90 of the Act (after amendment) dealing with the power of revision by the Tribunal is apposite to the context. S.64-A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939 reads as under :

“64-A. Revision. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may either on its own motion or on an application made to it call for the record of any case in which on order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies; and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final:

Provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order:

Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it i