Shaffique, J.

1. This petition is filed by the appellant claiming refund of one half of the court fees paid the appeal.

2. The appeal was withdrawn by filing a memo stating that the appellant and respondent have settled the matter out of court and the appellant prefers to withdraw the appeal. In the memo there was a request to refund to entire court fee. The question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled for refund of any court fee paid in the appeal.

3. According to the learned counsel for appellant, when the appeal is withdrawn on arriving at a settlement between the appellant and the respondent, it amounts to a compromise as envisaged under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred as ‘Code’) attracting Section 69 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

Section 69 of the Act reads as under:

“Refund in cases of compromise or when suit is decided on the admission of parties.-“When a suit or appeal or is compromised or when a suit is decided solely on the admission of the parties without any investigation, one-half of the Court-fee paid on the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties by whom the same have been paid, respectively:

Provided that no refund shall be ordered where only one-tenth of the amount of fee on plaint as per section 4A or one-third of the amount of fee on memorandum of appeal as per section 52 has been paid by the parties.

4. Apparently, one half court fee on the memorandum of appeal shall be ordered to be refunded if an appeal is compromised. The short question is whether the memo now produced by the counsel for appellant amounts to compromise. The memo reads as under:

“The appellant and the respondent have settled the matter out of court. Hence the appellant be permitted to withdrawn this appeal. The entire court fees paid be refunded.”

This memo is signed by the appellant and counsel for appellant.

5. Heard the learned counsel for appellant and the learned Government Pleader hearing on behalf of the State.

6. The following judgments have been relied upon by either side which are relevant for a clear understanding of the legal position in respect of the above issue.

(i) Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) v. Rajinder Singh [2006(5) SCC 566] was a case in which the statements of plaintiffs counsel and defendants counsel were recorded on oath by the trial court in regard to the terms of compromise and those statements were read over and accepted to be correct and signed by the said counsel. Having referred to the earlier judgments on the point as to what amounts to “signed by parties” as held in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India (1992 (1) SCC 31) and Jineshwardas v. Jagrani (2003 (11) SCC 372) the Supreme Court held that the statements of the parties or the counsel recorded by the court and duly signed by the person making the statements would be statements in writing signed by the parties and amounts to a compromise in terms of Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code.

(ii) Nadesan v. Dinesan [2002 (2) KLT 889] is a Division Bench judgment where the parties have entered into a compromise. A reference was made to the judgment in Fr. Antony v. Clariat & Convent E. Society (1998 (1) KLT 299) wherein it is held that a recording of the settlement by court is necessary only when the parties to the litigation desire the help of the Court to pass a decree in terms of settlement. It is held in the said judgment that the word settlement include “compromise” also. But if a decree is to be passed on the basis of a compromise or settlement, the procedure prescribed in the Order XXIII Rule 3 has to be followed.

(iii) In Manilanl Panicker v. Titto Abraham (2011 (4) KLT 725), a Division Bench of this Court, while construing the provisions of Section 69 of the Act in the light of settlement under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Kerala) (her