Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. Kerala State Electricity Board and its officer are in appeal against the decree passed in a suit for damages for loss caused due to the electrocution of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.

2. Vinod Kumar was electrocuted in the morning of 23.7.2001 when he came in contact with live wire line which had snapped from its alignment. The incident is not disputed. Appellants pleaded that natural calamity resulted in the incident and there is no culpable negligence. That plea was found against. Applying the doctrine of strict liability, that defence had to fail - See, Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [1920 AC 662], W.B.SEB v. Sachin Banerjee [(1999) 9 SCC 21], M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari [(2002) 2 SCC 162] and Varghese and another v. K.S.E.B. [ILR 2013 (2) Ker.99].

3. The court below granted an amount of Rs.2 lakhs as damages with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the incident till date of decree and future interest therefrom at 6% per annum.

4. This appeal was admitted condoning delay of 435 days on payment of costs. With no defence to that effect before the court below or in the appeal as it was initially laid, the appellants applied for leave to raise an additional ground of appeal to the effect that the suit was barred by limitation. The arguments mainly advanced before us were as to whether such a plea could be raised for the first time in appeal and as to whether the suit was barred by limitation.

5. Reference was made by the learned counsel for the respondents to Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram [AIR 1963 SC 1165] and Indore Municipality v. Niyamatulla [AIR 1971 SC 97] to point out that a new plea of limitation involving mixed question of law and facts should not be allowed to be raised at the stage of argument. The plea of limitation now sought to be raised as an additional ground is based on the admitted fact that Vinod Kumar was electrocuted on 23.7.2001 and the original petition by the plaintiffs seeking leave to sue as indigents was presented on 7.4.2004. That plea is not based on any disputed question of fact. It is essentially a question of law in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Hence, the application for leave to raise additional grounds in appeal is allowed to the extent it relates to the plea that the suit was barred by limitation.

6. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that in terms of Article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit ought to have been filed within a period of two years from the date of the death of the person killed. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, argued that applying the precedent, K.S.E.B. v. Bhaskaran Nair [2002 (3) KLT 324], it is trite law that it is Article 113 that governs and therefore, the period of limitation is three years from when the right to sue accrues.

7. In Bhaskaran Nair (supra), which was also a case for compensation for death due to electric shock, this Court held that such a suit is to be treated as one for compensation or damages on account of a tortious act committed by the State and would, hence, fall under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Reliance was placed on Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 1] and State of A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy [(2000) 5 SCC 712]. We may add that in so far as the State of Kerala is concerned, the Kerala Torts (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976, among other things, in Section 2 thereof, inter alia, provides that on the death of any person after the commencement of that Act, all causes of action vested in him shall survive for the benefit of his estate except as regards the causes of action excluded as per the proviso to that section. Such survival is in favour of the estate and Section 3 of that Act provides that where a cause of action survives as aforesaid for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, damages recoverable for the benefit of the estate of that person