Antony Dominic, J.

1. The issue that is raised for consideration is the correctness of a proceedings initiated against the appellant under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, which was upheld by the learned single Judge.

2. Bereft of the details which are irrelevant, facts of the case are that the appellant, who has established an industrial unit manufacturing plastic products, is an LT IV consumer of electricity supplied by the respondents. His premises were inspected by the APTS of the Board on 14.3.2003 and was issued Ext.P3 bill. Ext.P5 appeal filed by the appellant was disposed of by Ext.P6 order directing revision of the bill and accordingly, Exts.P7 to P9 were issued. It was in these circumstances the writ petition was filed challenging the aforesaid proceedings. The writ petition was dismissed and hence the appeal.

3. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents and have considered the submissions made by both sides.

4. The contention urged by the counsel for the appellant was that the appellate authority erred in not disposing of the appeal, in the light of the provisions of the Electricity Act 2003, (hereinafter referred to as the 2003 Act', for short) which was brought into force with effect from 10.6.2003 and not the Electricity Act, 1910, which has been repealed. According to him, penalty was imposed invoking Clause 43 of the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy framed under section 79(j) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and that the levy could, at best, have been possible under section 126 of the 2003 Act. To buttress his argument, counsel placed reliance on the Apex Court judgments in Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan [(1989) 2 SCC 557], Gajrag Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal [(1997) 1 SCC 650], Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India [(2000) 2 SCC 536] and Gammon India Ltd. v. Special Chief Secretary [(2006) 3 SCC 354] and the judgment of this Court in K.S.E.B. v. Najeeb [2005(1)KLT 406].

5. To answer this contention, it is necessary to notice certain relevant dates, facts and statutory provisions. The premises of the appellant was inspected by the APTS squad on 14.3.2003. Based on the findings and the report of the TMR, Pallom, on the basis that it made out a case of theft of electrical energy as provided under Clause 43 of the Conditions for Supply of Electrical Energy, penalty was levied and accordingly, bill was issued to the appellant on 17.3.2003. Aggrieved by the aforesaid proceedings, on 31.3.2003, the appellant filed Ext.P6 appeal, invoking the appellate remedy under Clause 48 of the Conditions of Supply of Electrical Energy, which was disposed of by Ext.P6 order dated 2.3.2005. It was in the meanwhile that with effect from 10.6.2003, the 2003 Act was brought into force.

6. It is trite that the penalty that will visit upon an offender is determined with reference to the law that prevailed at the time when the offence is committed. Therefore, even if there is a subsequent change of law, that cannot have any impact on the proceedings against the offender. This is pellucid from section 6 of the General Clauses Act which enumerates, inter alia, that where any enactment is repealed, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced. It was in such a context that in Gajraj Singh's case (supra), the Apex Court held that repeal of an enactment leads to the position that except as to transactions past and closed, as if the repealed Act had never existed and the effect thereof is to obliterate the Act completely from the record of the Parliament as if it had never been passed; it never existed except f