Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant quite in extenso.

2. The appellant is the respondent in a proceedings before a Labour Court. The dispute pending before that authority is related to the dismissal of the first respondent herein. The appellant pleaded before the Labour Court that the question whether the first respondent herein is a workman for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act, be determined as a preliminary issue. The Labour Court refused to do so. That was challenged by the appellant in writ petition. The learned single Judge, noticing the law laid in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1984 SC 153] affirmed the stand of the Labour Court that in view of that judgment, it is not necessary to decide the issue as a preliminary one. Hence, this writ appeal.

3. While the learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the existence of a jural relationship between a workman and the establishment is sine qua non as a jurisdictional fact for the Labour Court to enter on adjudication, we think that there is nothing in law to compel that such issue should be decided as a preliminary issue in all cases. There is no statutory mandate in that regard. D.P.Maheshwari is itself a pointer to the fact that the attempt should be to shorten the litigation life span rather than permit multi-tier agitation of issues piecemeal, at least in labour cases. In the case in hand, though the question whether the Secretary of a Cooperative Society is, or not, one who would be a workman for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, may have to be decided ultimately, the quality of materials and evidence, including issues as to duties and responsibilities attached to that office necessarily prompts us to think that no interference is called for with the decision of the learned single Judge. The appellant would not be put to any harm, if all issues are decided by the Labour Court in one go. We do not find any legal infirmity or error in the decision of the learned single Judge in exercising the discretion by refusing to interfere. The writ appeal, therefore, fails.

In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed.