K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

1. Petitioner is a retired Secretary of the respondent Bank, against whom, arbitration proceedings were initiated, which ended in Ext.P1 award. Petitioner, in the present writ petition, is aggrieved by the order, passed on the preliminary objection raised, in the revision filed by the petitioner. Admittedly, there is no time limit prescribed under Section 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 for filing a revision. It is, hence, the contention of the petitioner that, Ext.P3 order passed, dismissing the revision on the question of delay, is improper.

2. This Court in Thajuddin Shameer vs. Secretary, Coastal Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. 2004 (1) K.L.T. 909 has held that, time limit for filing a revision before the Co-operative Tribunal under Section 84 is 90 days, even though there is no time limit for filing a revision petition before the Co-operative Tribunal. If such a revision is filed beyond 90 days, which is considered normally as the reasonable prescription, then the petitioner should explain the reasons for the delay. Under such circumstances, the petitioner seeks for re-consideration of the revision. The petitioner seeks an opportunity to explain the reason for delay, since Thajuddin Shameer (supra) was subsequent to the rejection of the revision in 2002.

3. Even as per the specific admission of the petitioner in Ext.P2, the petitioner received copy of the Award on 6.4.1999, which the Arbitrator had forwarded under Rule 67(8) of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules, 1969. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Bank that, in fact, notice was attempted to be served on the petitioner in the arbitration case, which could not be effectively served and hence, notice was taken by paper publication. It is only in such circumstance that, the Arbitrator proceeded ex-parte and passed the Award. Petitioner, though received copy of the Award on 6.4.1999, filed Ext.P2 only on 14.8.2000, i.e. after the expiry of more than one year and four months. It is also pertinent to note that, Ext.P2 does not disclose any reason or explanation for the inordinate delay caused. In such circumstances, it may not be proper for this Court to interfere with the order passed in the preliminary objection raised by the respondent Bank, produced at Ext.P3.

4. Further, the Tribunal has relied on two decisions of this Court in Narayanan vs. Rent Controller, 1988 (2) K.L.T. 74 and Moideen Koya vs. Kunhammed Haji, 1999 (2) K.L.T. 646 (FB), wherein it was held that, despite there being no time limit prescribed in an enactment, normally, the reasonable prescription would be a time limit of 90 days. Though the petitioner's counsel would contend that, the said declaration has been made under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, this Court is of the opinion that, the principles would squarely apply in this case also. It is also significant that Thajuddin Shameer (supra) followed the afore-cited decisions and applied it to the revision under Section 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969.

5. In Narayanan's case (supra), the Court considered the question of limitation, when approaching the District Court under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act. There was no period specified for invoking such revisional power of the District Court, under Section 20. A learned single Judge of this Court found that the provision enabling the District Court at any time to call for and examine the records of the appellate authority is in relation to any order passed or proceedings initiated. But, that does not lead to a presumption that, the District Court can exercise its jurisdiction at any future time without any limitation whatsoever. The exercise of revisional power being discretionary, the same was found to be a privilege conferred on the petitioner and not a right. The exercise of power as such would be an exercise of discretion, which could be refused when there is an inordinate delay.