P.B. Suresh Kumar, J.

1. Petitioner in the writ petition is the appellant. He is a Law Officer in the service of the first respondent company. A domestic enquiry was ordered by the first respondent company on a memo of charges issued to the appellant. According to the appellant, the presenting officer at the domestic enquiry is a legally trained person and he is therefore, at a considerable disadvantage in the enquiry. Though he had requested for permission to engage a lawyer to appear on his behalf in the enquiry, his request was not considered. It is in the said circumstances, the appellant had approached this court and sought a direction to the company to permit him to engage a lawyer in the domestic enquiry. Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which was brought into force on 15.06.2011, was pressed into service to sustain the said relief.

2. The learned single Judge took the view that the purpose of the domestic enquiry being one to ascertain the facts, after affording the employee concerned an opportunity of hearing, it cannot be said that an enquiry officer is a person who is legally authorised to take evidence, to attract Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

3. We have heard senior counsel Sri. Ranjith Thampan for the appellant and senior counsel Sri. E.K. Nandakumar for the respondents.

4. The learned senior counsel for the appellant, relying on the decision of this Court in Subramanya Pillai K. v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC and others, (2009 (3) KHC 787), contended that the enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a factual finding, based on the materials brought on record by the parties and therefore, it has to be held that he is legally authorised to take evidence. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India and Another [(2012)3 SCC 178], he has also contended that the disciplinary proceedings are quasi criminal in nature and therefore, it cannot be held that the enquiry officer is not a person legally authorised to take evidence.

5. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Company submitted that the law in this country does not concede an absolute right of representation to an employee as part of his right to be heard, unless the rules, regulation or standing orders, if any, regulating the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings, specifically recognise such a right and provide for such a representation. He relied on the decision of the Apex Court in National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. K.V. Rama Reddy [(2006)11 SCC 645] in support of his submission. According to him, Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 has not brought any change at all to the law on the point as settled by a catena of decisions.

6. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant did not dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Apex court in National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. v. K.V. Rama Reddy (supra). But, according to him, the principles settled as regards the right of an employee to be represented by a lawyer, in a domestic enquiry, need a re-look, in the light of the provision in Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961. An observation made to that effect by this Court in Sebastian K. Antony v. Manager, St.Albert's College, Ernakulam and others[2012 KHC 347] was also brought to our notice.

7. In the light of the submissions made at the Bar, the question arises for consideration is whether Section 30 of the Advocates Act confer on a litigant a right to be represented by an advocate before the enquiry officer in a domestic enquiry?

8. The provision in Section 30 of the Advocates' Act, 1961 reads thus:

"30. Subject to the provisions of this Act, every advocate whose name is entered in the common roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories to which this Act extends--

(i) in all courts including the Supreme Court.

(ii) before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence: and

(iii) before any other authority or