The District Collector's failure to issue a notice as required by Section 81(1)(k) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act rendered the impugned order legally unsustainable.

1. The case depicts a fine illustration as to how recklessly the interests of the State are being handled by its top officers!

2. The petitioner company was directed by the Taluk Land Board, Kanayannur to surrender 0.894 Hectres (2 Acres) of unutilised excess land in its possession, at the southern side of the Rotary Club in survey No.245 of Thrikkakkara North Village, Kanayannur Taluk. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner challenged the same before this Court in C.R.P. No.1100/2001 on the specific ground that for ordering such a surrender within the meaning of Section 81(1)(k) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, the District Collector ought to have issued a direction to the petitioner being an industrial establishment to utilise the unutilised land within a particular period and since such a mandatory requirement was not complied with, the petitioner company ought not to have been directed to surrender such excess land.

3. C.R.P. No.1100/2001 was heard in detail by this Court, and vide order dated 12.04.2002, the same was disposed of by specifically directing the Taluk Land Board, Kanayannur,

“to consider the case of the petitioner that the District Collector has not issued any notice as contemplated under the proviso to clause (k) of Section 81 of the KLR Act with notice and opportunity to the petitioner and to respondents 1 and 3”.

A time limit of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of that order was also prescribed for the disposal of the matter. Without complying with the direction in its letter and spirit, the Taluk Land Board has once again passed the very same order as the one impugned in C.R.P. No.1100/2001. The company has come up in revision.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader.

5. It seems that a specific direction was given to the Taluk Land Board to consider the question under Section 81 (1)(k) of the KLR Act. The respondents herein cannot be heard to say that they were not aware of any such direction passed by this Court. Further, they cannot be heard to say that the petitioner company is not an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 81 (1)(k) as the same was not challenged at all in C.R.P. No.1100/2001. Having conceded to such an order, after these much years, the State cannot come forward with a contention that the petitioner company is not an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 81(1)(k) of the KLR Act. If as a matter of fact, they had any contention that it is a factory within the meaning of Section 81(1)(c) and not an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 81(1)(k) of the KLR Act, the State ought to have specifically taken such a contention in C.R.P. No.1100/2001. Having chosen to concede to the order, the State is estopped from presently contending that the petitioner company is not an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 81(1)(k) of the KLR Act whereas, it is only a factory within the meaning of Section 81 (1)(c) of the KLR Act.

6. The learned Special Government Pleader has strenuously contended that the petitioner company is merely a factory within the meaning of Section 81(1)(c) of the KLR Act and it is not an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 81(1)(k) of the KLR Act. As observed above, the State at present cannot be heard to say that the petitioner company is not an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 81(1)(k) of the KLR Act. At the same time, it seems that the other question whether the company is a factory within the meaning of Section 81(1)(c) of the KLR Act was not considered in any of the proceedings earlier. Such a plea or contention was not taken up by the State in any of the earlier proceedings. Of course, being a question of law, the State can moot the question independently whether the petitioner company is merely a factory within the meaning of Section 81(1)(c) of the KLR Act.

7. It seems that the rema