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2015 Supreme(Ker) 41

High Court of Kerala
DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J.
M/s. Onset Developers rep. by its Managing Partner P.J. Dani - Appellant
Versus
Secretary, Akathethara Grama Panchayat Palakkad & Another - Respondents
WP (C) No. 33233 of 2014 (D)
Decided on: 27-01-2015

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Rajesh Sivaramankutty, Advocate.
For the Respondents:U. Balagangadharan, Advocate.

Headnote:A. Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, Sections 235C and 166 -Constitution of India, 1950 Article 226 Kerala Pachayath Raj Act, 1994, Section 182(iii) -It is not important that to issue notification upon the grama pachayath -It is not violated under article 226 that the even if the decision of the grama pachayath is void

Judgment

1. Briefly stated, when the petitioner initially submitted Exhibit P5 application for building permit, it was returned on the ground that the land proposed to be constructed upon comprised wet land in part. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner, having filed W.P. (C) No. 9940/2014, invited Exhibit P1 judgment, through which this Court set aside the order (Ext.P7 therein) of the Secretary, the first respondent, and directed the said authority to consider petitioner's application afresh, without reference to the issue of wet land in terms of Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008.

2. As could be seen from records, after complying with all other statutory parameters, the petitioner resubmitted his application to the first respondent, who in turn issued Exhibit P2 proposing to approve the building permit on the condition of the technical clearance from the Assistant Engineer of the Local Self Government Institutions. As was reflected in Exhibit P3, after the technical clearance was granted, the second respondent — the Committee of Grama Panchayat — passed resolution interdicting the permit proposed to be granted by the first respondent on the ground that any construction by the petitioner on the site would lead to traffic jams, drinking water pollution, and other health hazards, as well as lack of provision for flow of pollutants.

3. The first respondent, in turn, based on Exhibit P3 resolution passed by the second respondent, issued Exhibit P4 proceedings rejecting the petitioner's application for building permit. Assailing Exhibit P4, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that Exhibit P4 is ultra vires of the second respondent, inasmuch as there is no specific provision to which the second respondent could trace its power to interdict the decision of the first respondent, the Secretary. In that regard, he has placed reliance on a judgment rendered by this Court in Dharmadom Paristhithi Samrakshana Samithi v. Dharmadom Grama Panchayat, [2010 (2) KLT 194].

5. The learned counsel has also submitted that if at all the second respondent has any power, it ought to be traced to Section 235C of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, which in turn requires the necessary notification to be published by the said Grama Panchayat so as to regulate the construction of any building within its limits. He has further submitted that, based on the direction of this Court earlier, the first respondent has already filed an affidavit testifying to the fact that no such notification was issued by the Grama Panchayat.

6. Strenuous efforts have been made by the learned counsel to repel the contention of the respondent Grama Panchayat on the issue of the petitioner’s having an efficacious alternative remedy by way of approaching the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. He would submit that only when the first respondent Secretary exercises his power under Section 235J, if any person is aggrieved thereby, he can lay challenge against the said order before the Tribunal. In other words, once it is established that an order is void on the touchstone of the principle of ultra vires, the question of alternative remedy does not arise.

7. Summing up his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged this Court to set aside Exhibit P4, apart from issuing a consequential direction to grant the building permit to the petitioner.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent Grama Panchayat has strenuously contended that the second respondent has got the necessary power under Section 166 of the Act. According to him, in terms of Section 166 of the Act, the activities specified in Schedule III appended to the Act could be regulated by the Committee of the Grama Panchayat. He has further submitted that once the second respondent has taken any decision, it is the duty of the first respondent Secretary, to place the matter before the Government under pro
















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