The main legal point established in the judgment is the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat in making lease renewal decisions, the requirement to exercise powers as prescribed by the statute, and the prohibition on abdicating administrative powers or allowing external influence in decision-making.

1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents, apart from perusing the record. Since the issue lies in a narrow compass, this Court proposes to dispose of the writ petition at the admission stage itself.

2. Briefly stated, the petitioner, a lessee of a shop room from the first respondent Grama Panchayat, applied for renewal of the lease for the year 2014-2015. The respondent Grama Panchayat, however, refused to renew the lease and the decision is said to have been communicated through the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat as could be seen from Exhibits P1 and P3. Assailing Exhibits P1 and P3 on the ground that instead of the Secretary, the competent authority, the committee of the Grama Panchayat has taken a decision concerning the non-renewal of the lease, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Sections 185 B, 236(3) and 276 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, and has contended that the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat is the primary authority to take a decision in terms of Section 236 and that his mere repetition or reproduction of the decision said to have been taken by the committee of the Grama Panchayat is nothing but an abdication of the administrative power conferred on him.

4. The learned counsel for the Grama Panchayat has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the petitioner. He has submitted that the petitioner violated the lease conditions by subletting the property and that in response to a show cause notice issued earlier, the very petitioner submitted a reply admitting his violating the lease condition. He has further contended that the Secretary is only an agent of the Grama Panchayat carrying out the instructions of the Grama Panchayat. In other words, there is no material difference whether the decision not to renew the lease is taken either by the committee of the Grama Panchayat or the Secretary, inasmuch as it is the decision of the Grama Panchayat, to whom the property belongs.

5. This Court does not intend to go into the merits of the issue whether there is any violation of the lease conditions. It is, however, to be held that there is sufficient force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat is the primary authority who has got statutory responsibility of taking a decision on the issue of either granting the lease or renewing it. In fact, the Grama Panchayat could at best be the appellate authority under Section 276 of the Act vis-a-vis the decisions rendered by the Secretary or any other official in the Grama Panchayat.

6. It is trite to observe that once the statute mandates that a particular power is to be exercised in a certain manner, either it ought to be exercised in that manner or not at all. This Court has observed in Cochin College v. Ajith Kumar, I.L.R. 2014 (4) Kerala 532 (DB), thus:

“In A.K. Janardhanan v. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies and Ors. (1990 (1) KLJ 477), the court, repeating judicial dictum of vintage value, beginning with Taylor v. Taylor (1876 (1) Ch D 426), having found its way to Inida in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (AIR 1936 PC 253), emphasised to the effect that it is also well established that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Even if there be no negative words, that shall not be done in any other way. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden.”

7. On the issues of abdication and dictation, in his treatise ‘Administrative Law’ (9th edition, Oxford), the noted jurist Sir Willaim Wade, under a Chapter entitled ‘Surrender, Abdication and Dictation’ has commended thus:

“Closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority may share its