The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 276 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, regarding the filing of appeals within the statutory period and the requirement for condonation of delay.

Under challenge in this writ petition is Ext.P6 common order passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions, Thiruvananthapuram in Appeal Nos.684/2013, 732/2013 & 733/2013.

2. Appeal No.684/2013 was filed by the 3rd respondent challenging Ext.P4 building permit dated 03.10.2011 issued by the 1st respondent panchayath in the name of the petitioner. Appeal No.732/2013 is filed by the 4th respondent challenging the decision dated 16.04.2013 of the 1st respondent panchayath and the consequential licence dated 02.05.2013 [Ext.P3(b)] issued by the 2nd respondent, by which blasting and mining operation of granite quarry by the petitioner was permitted. Appeal No.733/2013 is filed by the 3rd respondent challenging the decision dated 30.09.2011 [Ext.P3(f)] by the 1st respondent panchayath, by which permit was granted to the petitioner to conduct a quarry and to conduct a crusher unit in the property comprised in Block No.49 of the Uzhamalakkal Village. By Ext.P6 order, the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions allowed the appeals and set aside the respective proceedings issued by respondents 1 and 2. The Tribunal directed fresh consideration of the matter in a time bound manner following the legal requirements in accordance with law.

3. The petitioner alleges that the appeals were not maintainable under Section 276 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 as they were miserably barred by limitation. The petitioner points out that the appeals were filed belatedly with a delay of more than 650 days. According to the petitioner, there was no provision for condonation of delay and the appeals were filed without any application for condonation of delay; and therefore, the Tribunal ought to have dismissed the appeals at the threshold itself. The petitioner further alleges that Ext.P6 order was passed by the Tribunal in a mechanical manner acting in excess of its jurisdiction.

4. In the detailed counter affidavit filed by respondents 3 and 4, they have justified the impugned order.

5. Arguments have been heard.

6. The main challenge against Ext.P6 order is regarding the alleged delay in filing the appeals. The learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that as per Section 276 of the Kerala Panchayath Raj Act, an appeal has to be filed within 30 days of the impugned order and the above appeals were filed belatedly. In support of the argument, the learned counsel invited my attention to a decision of this Court in Thomas Thomas v. Kottayam Municipality [2008 (3) KLT 964], wherein it was observed that once the statutory period of limitation has expired, the party looses its right of appeal and therefore, it is not open to him to invoke the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and bypass the statutory restrictions and get the delay condoned or to have the matter examined by this Court. It was observed that proviso to Rule 8(3) authorizes the Tribunal to condone delay of only one month if it is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the delay. My attention was also brought to the decision of this Court in Mallappally Grama Panchayath, Pathanamthitta v. Zeenath Beevi & Another [2014 (3) KHC 32], wherein it was held that the Tribunal may admit a petition submitted within one month after the time limit if the Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within the time limit; and though the rule does not provide for filing of a separate petition for condonation of the delay, it is always advisable to file a petition to condone the delay also so that the Tribunal can satisfy itself that there was sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within the time limit. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that there is inordinate delay in filing the appeal and there was no petition to condone the delay.

7. The learned counsel for the party respondents per contra would contend that the decisions, reported above, have no relevance in this