Antony Dominic, J.

Petitioners in W.P. (C) 10699/12 and 11666/12 are the appellants. The writ petitions, raising common issues, were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment. For the same reason, these writ appeals were also heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment, treating writ appeal 2142/12 as the leading case.

2. W.A.2142/12 arises from the judgment in W.P.(C)10699/12. The appellant and the third respondent, a Government company, responded to Ext.P2 tender notice. The contract was ultimately awarded to the third respondent, extending them the benefit of Ext.P3 Government Order whereby the Government declared that the third respondent is pre- qualified to undertake civil works put to tender by State Government Departments except National Highway works and Central Government sponsored works and Exts.P4 and P5, which allowed them a price preference of 10% on the lowest quoted rate. In the said circumstances, the writ petition was filed challenging Exts.P3 to P5 and consequently to quash the award of work to the third respondent. In the judgment under appeal, the learned Single Judge upheld the Government Orders and the work awarded to the third respondent and dismissed the writ petition. On the same reasoning, Writ Petition 11666/12 was also dismissed, against which W.A.2156/12 is filed.

3. We heard the counsel for the appellants, learned Government Pleader and the Standing Counsel appearing for the third respondent.

4. In so far as Exts.P4 and P5 Government Orders dated 28.4.1988 and 7.8.1997 allowing price preference of 10% on the lowest quoted rate are concerned, subsequently by G.O.(P) 14/2015/Fin. dated, 13.1.2015 the Government have ordered that the price preference enjoyed by the third respondent will be allowed only to works directly executed by the Corporation, without the involvement of subcontractors. In that view of the matter, we do not think that the price preference that is now given by the Government to the third respondent can be successfully assailed by the appellants and no arguments on that issue were also addressed before us. Similarly, having regard to the long lapse of time, we are also not probing into the legality of the award of works, which were under challenge.

5. In such circumstances, the arguments raised before us were confined to the validity and scope of Ext.P3 Government Order dated 12.2.92 whereby the Government declared the third respondent pre- qualified for the works mentioned therein. According to the appellants, this Government Order declaring the third respondent pre-qualified, is violative of Article 14, being arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. To support this contention, counsel for the appellants relied on judgments of the Apex Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. the International Airport Authority of India and others [AIR 1979 SC 1628], Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Represented v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [AIR 1980 SC 1992] and Union of India and others v. Hindustan Development Corporation and Others (1993) 3 SCC 499. Counsel also submitted that the Government Order was issued taking note of the expertise and the equipments that were available with the third respondent. According to him, the admitted case of the third respondent is that they are no longer having any equipments and every work awarded to them is got executed through their sub contractors. Therefore, according to the counsel, the very premise on which Ext.P3 order was issued no longer survives.

6. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader and the Standing Counsel for the third respondent unanimously contended that the third respondent being a public sector undertaking of the Government of Kerala is entitled to be preferred in the matter of awarding contracts and that such preference has been accepted by this Court in its judgment in Niodigital (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala and others [ILR 2010 (4) Kerala 462]. Counsel also contended that the third respondent is now e