The court clarified the Corporation's right to verify and consider all alleged unauthorised constructions and upheld the judgment in Dorphy v. State of Kerala [2012 (4) KLT 264] regarding the interpretation of 'High Rise building' under Rule 110 of the KMB Rules.

A. M. Shaffique, J.

These appeals have been filed against the common judgment dated 12/03/2015 in W.P.C.Nos.25997/2011 and 32715/2011. The 3rd respondent in W.P.C.No.25997/2011 and the 5th respondent in W.P.C.No.32715/2011 being the same person, has filed these appeals.

2. The issued involved in W.P.C.No.25997/2011 had arisen on account of the petitioner, who is the 1st respondent herein, challenging Ext.P8, an order passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions and for a further direction to quash Ext.P4 order. Direction is also sought against the Kollam Corporation not to enforce Ext.P4 order before disposal of Ext.P3 regularization application submitted by the petitioner. Ext.P8 order, which was impugned, relates to an appeal filed by the 1st respondent herein/writ petitioner and another challenging the order passed by the Secretary of the Corporation on 12/05/2011 (Ext.P4) by which, proceedings were taken by the Corporation under Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, on a finding that the 1st respondent had made unauthorised constructions in respect of a building owned by him. The Tribunal, after evaluating the entire factual issues that had arisen in the case, found that the unauthorised constructions mentioned as item Nos.1 to 4, 8, 11 to 13 are admitted by the 1st respondent and that the unauthorised constructions mentioned in Item Nos.5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 are proved by the Corporation. The Tribunal also took note of the submissions made by the Corporation that the unauthorised constructions cannot be regularised. It was further observed that necessary orders have to be passed by the Corporation in that regard. In the said circumstances, the Tribunal observed that there is no legal infirmity in the order passed by the Corporation under Section 406 of the Municipality Act and accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

3. W.P.C.No.32715/2011 is filed by the very same writ petitioner in W.P.C.No.25997/2011 along with another person, to challenge Exts.P6, P7, P9, P10, P12, P13, P14 and P16 on the allegation that those orders were issued in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners and for a direction to the Corporation, the Chief Town Planner and the District Town Planning Officer not to prevent the petitioners from carrying out the white washing, painting work, air-conditioning work, aluminum composite glass paneling work and removal of partition walls of the independent shop rooms in the first and second floor of the building for which occupancy certificates were already granted. Exts.P6, P7, P9, P10, P12, P13, P14 and P16 are notices by which the petitioner was called upon to desist from making any constructions in the building by way of white washing, painting etc. Further, it was indicated that certain constructions made by the petitioner have not been regularised and therefore they were called upon not to make any further construction in the said building. The main contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was that the said work does not amount to any violation of the permit conditions nor any permit was required for the same.

4. Respondents had opposed the writ petition inter alia contending that there was no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal in so far as the unauthorised constructions were proved or rather admitted by the building owner. It was also pointed out that there was justification on the part of the respondent authorities in issuing stop memos against the writ petitioners on account of the violation of statutory provisions.

5. The learned Single Judge, by a common judgment, opined that as far as W.P.C.No.25997/2011 was concerned, since orders were passed by the Tribunal, it will be open to the respondent Corporation to take appropriate steps for removal of unauthorised constructions, if any, still existing, except with respect to the items, which, according to the writ petitioner, were already removed. The learned Single Judge observed that