The issue of adjudicatory avoidance by this Court on the ground of alternative remedy is raised as frequently as the monsoon rains in this state— continually, almost incessantly. Decided definitively though, it still raises its head indefatigably, for the definitive decisions have, with unfailing regularity, held that it is a matter of discretion borne out of a self-imposed restriction on the part of the Constitutional Courts. This case is yet another instance.

2. The petitioner, presently working as the Branch Manager in the respondent society seeks promotion to the post of Chief Accountant. Complaining of denial of an opportunity, the petitioner has approached this Court.

3. Sri. P.N. Mohanan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has painstakingly advanced various submissions touching on the merits of the matter.

4. The learned counsel for the third respondent bank has, however, submitted that the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-Operative Societies Act, 1969 ('the Act' for brevity). According to him, unless there are compelling reasons for this Court to entertain the writ petition, the petitioner ought to be relegated to the primary adjudicatory authority i.e., the Arbitration Court in terms of Section 69 of the Act. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent Bank has placed reliance on Raveendran P.S v. State of Kerala and others, ILR 2007(3) Kerala 241 and also on Union of India and another v. Guwahati Carbon Limited, (2012) 11 SCC 651.

5. To meet the preliminary jurisdictional objection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has initially submitted that the writ petition was filed quite some time ago, i.e., on 04.02.2015, and that the issue raised in this writ petition is essentially a pure question of law, admitting of no disputed questions of fact. According to him, notwithstanding the alternative remedy provided under the statute, this Court can as well hear the matter on merits.

6. The learned counsel has contended that there are established grounds of judicial review in the face of alternative remedy. According to him, the denial of petitioner's claim to be considered for promotion is in violation of his fundamental right to be considered for promotion. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Harbanslal Sahina & Anr. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., & Anr., (2003) 2 SCC 107, Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 3471 and Union of India v. Hemraj Singh Chauhan, (2010) 4 SCC 290.

7. The learned counsel has further submitted that the writ petition filed on 04.02.2015 was soon thereafter admitted by this Court. Once the writ petition is admitted, contends the learned counsel, the question of alternative remedy does not fall for consideration. It is also the contention of the learned counsel that after a lapse of about five months from the date of filing of the writ petition, if the petitioner is to be relegated to a primary Tribunal in the name of alternative remedy, the petitioner would be put to irreparable hardship, especially given the fact that the petitioner is on the verge of superannuation. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 33 and State of H.P and others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and another, (2005) 6 SCC 499.

8. With a view to refuting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the third respondent Bank has, apart from reiterating the legal principle laid down by a learned Division Bench of this Court in Raveendran P.S (supra), further contended that the writ petition was admitted even before notice could be served on the respondents. Presenting the march of events chronologically, the learned counsel for the respondent bank has submitted that on 18.03.2015, on the date of second hearing, the first and second respondents filed counter affidavit; on se