2014 Supreme(Ker) 724
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
THE KERALA STATE DEFENCE SERVICE CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED – Appellant
THE ASSISTANT PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER, EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND ORGANISATION – Respondent
W.P.(C) No.29615 of 2014
Decided on : 10.11.2014
BY ADVS.SRI.B.ASHOK SHENOY, SRI.K.V.GEORGE, SRI.P.N.RAJAGOPALAN NAIR, SRI.P.S.GIREESH
R BY SRI.N.NAGARESH, ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
R BY SRI.A.RAJASIMHAN,SC,EPF ORGANISATION
Headnote:Constitution of India, 1950 Article 226 Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 Section 7(1) Limitation Act, 1963 Petition was dismissed on the basis that the penal petition was raised by the petitioner and appeal was though dismissed that the time for appeal was 60 days and the appellate authority was not having the power to decide the delay.
The petitioner is aggrieved with the proceedings of the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Kochi, issued at Ext.P7. Admittedly, the petitioner, had been engaging its members, as per contract entered into with other establishments, one of which is produced at Ext.P1. The petitioner had been deducting provident fund contributions and paying the same to the respondent Organisation. While so, the petitioner discontinued the contributions and hence an enquiry under 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for brevity, 'the EPF Act') was initiated.
2. The petitioner was issued with notice, and though initially the notice could not be served, subsequently, it was acknowledged and there was appearance on behalf of the Society. Repeated adjournments were sought for and no documents were produced by the petitioner before the enquiry officer.
3. The petitioner merely filed Ext.P4 wherein, it was stated that amounts were remitted for the year 2010-11 and a remittance was made as on 18.10.2012 also, which would satisfy the entire dues. No objections to the notice was filed and in such circumstance, the enquiry officer under the EPF Act issued Ext.P7 proceedings, which was dispatched on 18.07.2013. The petitioner does not have a contention that the petitioner did not receive Ext.P7 proceedings. The petitioner did absolutely nothing to challenge the same, especially when an appeal was provided under Section 7-I of the EPF Act.
4. The petitioner also did not pay off the contribution as indicated in Ext.P7. It was in such circumstance that penal proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and notice issued to show cause as to why a warrant of arrest should not be issued. The same is challenged before this Court. It goes without saying that, by the time the writ petition was filed, the period of limitation for filing an appeal was over.
5. The petitioner, to maintain the writ petition, despite having not availed of the remedy under Section 7-I of the EPF Act, takes up a plea that the provision under Rule 7(2) of the Employees Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 1997 is not one, which is sanctioned by the Act. Or more specifically, there is no provision in the Act whereby a period of limitation or a specific time for delay condonation could be prescribed and in such circumstance, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable, is the plea urged.
6. It is to be noticed that Section 7-I (2) specifically confers power on the appropriate Government to prescribe the form in which the appeal is to be filed, the fees which should accompany the appeal memorandum as also the time within which such appeal has to be filed. It is only invoking such powers that the Government has brought out the Rules of 1997, wherein; by sub-rule (2) of Rule 7, a time of 60 days is prescribed for preferring an appeal to the Tribunal and by the proviso a further time of 60 days is provided, in which period, the Tribunal has been conferred with the power to condone the delay.
7. It is trite that, when the Government has the power to prescribe the time in which an appeal has to be filed, it would also be conferred with the power to prescribe the time, as also confer the Tribunal with the authority, to condone any delay occasioned. If the Government does not provide a period within which a delayed appeal could be filed, then the appellate authority would not be conferred with the power to condone the delay; at all. There can be no assumption then, that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be attracted. So held a Division Bench of this Court in Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise v. Krishna Poduval [2005 (4) KLT 947].
This Court has by the decisions reported in Krishna Poduval (supra) and Panopharam v. Union of India [2010(3) KLT 149] also held that, Article 226 cannot be invoked to condone the delay when the statute or the rules framed thereunder specifically prescribes a period within which