Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.

Initially, the petitioner was granted Exhibit P1 building permit, but later it was cancelled through Exhibit P2 order. Impugning Exhibit P2 order of cancellation, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondent Corporation has initially granted Exhibit P1 building permit after following the due process. But, later cancelled it through Exhibit P2 order. He has contended that ostensibly what weighed with the authorities to issue Exhibit P2 order of cancellation is a proposed acquisition, regarding which steps are yet to be taken.

3. Placing reliance on Nasar v. Malappuram Municipality (2009 (3) KLT 92), Padmini v. State of Kerala (1999 (2) KLT 465) and Giri v. State of Kerala (2013 (2) KLT 443), the learned counsel has contended that substantial property rights of the petitioner, which have been constitutionally recognised, cannot be defeated on a mere proposal on the part of the authorities to acquire the said property. Accordingly, he has urged this Court to allow the writ petition.

4. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation, on instructions, has submitted that the respondent Corporation has been taking all steps to see that the acquisition proceedings are completed at the earliest. According to her, if any building permit is granted pending acquisition of the very land on which the petitioner proposes to construct, it leads to unnecessary and avoidable complications. Contending thus, the learned Standing Counsel has strenuously defended Exhibit P2.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent, apart from perusing the records.

6. Indeed, through Exhibit P1 the petitioner had been granted building permit. Later, through Exhibit P2 it was cancelled evidently based on a mere proposal of acquisition, which, in fact, has been recorded in Exhibit P2 as a matter of justification for cancelling Exhibit P1 permit. It is profitable to extract the Corporation's reasoning, which is as follows:

"On verification of the above facts in details, it is understood that Sri. Muhammed Subair has obtained the building permit by misleading the Corporation authorities. As the Council has decided to speed up the acquisition process of Kommeri play ground, it is hereby ordered cancelling the building per (TP8/19712/13 dated 2.7.13) obtained by Sri. Muhammed Subair unauthorizedly. This order will come into force with immediate effect. Therefore it is informed to stop all construction activities in the site and report the matter in writing and also to surrender the above referred building permit."

7. To a specific query from this Court, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that so far no notification has been issued, though steps are being taken in that regard. In other words, it can safely be concluded that the proposal of acquisition may be under active consideration of the respondent Corporation, but no steps in furtherance thereof have begun, as yet. We can hold without fear of contradiction that proceedings for acquisition usually begin with the issuance of a notification.

8. Firstly, this Court in Hassan v. Corporation of Calicut (1996 (2) KLT 839) considered the issue whether the rejection of the application submitted by the Appellants therein for permission to construct can be sustained in view of Clause (vii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 393 of the Kerala Municipality Act. In that case also, the Corporation of Calicut had the as only ground for rejection of the application, that it was proposing to acquire the land where the buildings were proposed to be constructed. This Court, per P.A. Mohammed, J., has held thus:

"5. It must be recalled that every citizen has the freedom to enjoy his land in a manner he likes of course subject to the prevailing laws in the country, the right to hold land and en- joyment thereof though is not a fundamental right, is a civil rig