1. These Revisions were referred to the Full Bench stating that in the decision of the Division Bench in Indian Saree House vs. Radhalakshmy, 2006 (3) KLT 129, the binding judgment in Shaji Varghese vs. Cherian, 1993 KHC 29 : 1993 (1) KLT 133, was not considered and that there is apparent conflict of views in the various decisions of this Court on the subject.

2. The main conflict of views noticed by the Division Bench is on the question whether Sections 11(3) and 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are mutually exclusive. In Indian Saree House vs. Radhalakshmy, 2006 (3) KLT 129 and in S. Sivasubramonia Iyer vs. S.H. Krishnaswamy, AIR 1981 Kerala 57, it was held that sub-sections (3) and (8) of Section 11 of the Act are mutually exclusive. In Shaji Varghese vs. Cherian, 1993 KHC 29 : 1993 (1) KLT 133 and in Muhammed vs. Abdul Rahiman, 1983 KLT 874 it was held that sub-sections (3) and (8) of Section 11 are not mutually exclusive.

3. For the sake of convenience, sub-sections (3) and (8) of Section 11 are extracted below:-

"11. Eviction of tenants:-

(1) to (2)........

(3) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him.

(4) to (7)........

(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."

4. The first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act provides that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction under sub-section (3) if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. The second proviso to Section 11(3) gives protection to the tenant. Even after holding that the bona fide need is established, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to the tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. The third and fourth provisos to Section 11 (3) contain certain other restrictions as well. The first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11 states that in the case of an application made under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In view of sub-section (10) of Section 11, the landlord has to establish his bona fides in the case of a claim for eviction under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) or (8).

5. The distinction between Section 11(3) and 11(8) was considered in various decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court. In Lekshmana Naikan vs. Gopalakrishna Pillai, 1981 KLT 167, the landlord sought eviction of his tenant from a portion of the building in which the landlord himself was residing. The question was whether the claim for eviction would lie under Section 11(3) or Section 11(8). Justice Subramonian Poti (as his Lordship then was), in Lekshmana Naikan's case, held that the distinction is relevant because the provisos to these sub-sections widely differ and, therefore, the questions that will have to be considered in the context of a claim under Section 11(3) would vary considerably from the questions relevant when