The main legal point established in the judgment is that the confiscation of the petitioner's vehicle under the Abkari Act was not justified as the vehicle was not actually used for committing the alleged offence, and the petitioner's knowledge of or complicity in the crime was not established.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader, apart from perusing the record.

2. The petitioner, the owner of a motor vehicle, assails Ext.P5 order of confiscation passed by the second respondent, who, in fact, confirmed the initial order of confiscation in Ext.P3 by the third respondent.

3. The facts in brief are that, on 21.07.2010, the petitioner's vehicle while being used by another person, namely one Mr. Shijo, was intercepted and seized by the fourth respondent on the allegation that it was used as an escort vehicle for another vehicle carrying certain contraband. In fact, Crime No. 27 of 2010 for the offence under Section 55(a) of the Act was also registered.

4. In the course of time, the third respondent, exercising his powers under Section 67B of the Abkari Act (the Act), confiscated the petitioner's vehicle through Ext.P3 order. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a statutory appeal and invited Ext.P4 order from the second respondent, who confirmed the third respondent's Ext.P3 order of confiscation. Further aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court.

5. Smt. Neethu G. Nadh, the learned counsel representing the learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously contended that the petitioner, though the owner of the vehicle, is not the accused in Crime No. 27 of 2010. According to her, the petitioner let out his motor vehicle, a Maruti car, to the said Shijo on 27.02.2010 on the strength of Ext.P2 agreement. She has further contended that at no point of time had the petitioner any knowledge concerning the alleged offence committed by the person who hired the petitioner's vehicle.

6. Having placed reliance on Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Paulson, 2009(1) KLT 959 and Nazer v. State, 1996(1) KLT 321 the learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner be given the benefit of Section 67C (2) of the Act because he has neither knowledge of nor complicity in the alleged crime, concerning which the petitioner's vehicle was confiscated.

7. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, has strenuously opposed the petitioner's claims and contentions. He has submitted that the authorities could clinchingly establish that the inmates of the mini-lorry carrying the contraband and those of the petitioner's vehicle, all through, had been in constant touch while the contraband was carried.

8. The learned Government Pleader has further submitted that despite the petitioner's initial plea before the third respondent that he let out the vehicle to the accused on the strength of an agreement, he miserably failed to produce it before the primary authority. According to him, Ext.P2 ought to have been fabricated only as an afterthought.

9. Placing reliance on Subair v. Assistant Excise Commissioner, 2008(1) KLT 493 and Sajin v. Assistant Excise Commissioner, 2009(2) KLT 389 the learned Government Pleader has submitted that the use of vehicle as an escort to another vehicle actually carrying the contraband is a composite ingredient of the transaction. In that sense, according to the learned Government Pleader, it can safely be concluded that the petitioner's vehicle has also been used for carrying the contraband.

10. Eventually, the learned Government Pleader has contended that the petitioner has further grossly failed to discharge his burden under Section 67C of the Act that despite his best care and caution, some third party has put his vehicle to an illegal use. Thus urged the learned Government Pleader this Court to dismiss the writ petition.

11. Indeed, the facts are not in dispute. As can be seen from the record, the petitioner's vehicle was not actually used for carrying contraband; however, it was allegedly used as an escort.

12. A perusal of Ext.P3 order reveals that the petitioner, despite his plea that he let out the vehicle on the strength of an agreement, could not produce a copy of the said agreement before the primary authority. The fact, nevertheless, remains that the petitione