P.B. Suresh Kumar, J.

1. The legal representatives of the plaintiff in a suit for possession are the appellants in this second appeal. The suit property which lies on the side of a public road belonged to the father of the fourth defendant. According to the plaintiff, she was put in possession of the suit property by its owner on an oral lease arrangement. The fourth defendant was the owner of the property on the west of the suit property. On 03/06/1993, the plaintiff was evicted from the suit property by the Public Works Department of the State on the premise that the same is a road poramboke. According to the plaintiff, she was evicted from the suit property at the instance of the fourth defendant. It is also her case that immediately after the eviction, the fourth defendant had enclosed the suit property with his property on its west. It is alleged by the plaintiff that the suit property is not a road poramboke and that the third defendant had no authority to evict her. It is also alleged by the plaintiff that the fourth defendant had subsequently transferred the property in his possession including the suit property to the fifth defendant. The suit was filed, in the circumstances, for possession of the suit property on the strength of the previous possession of the plaintiff. Defendants 3 and 5 contested the suit by filing separate written statements. The third defendant contended that the suit property is a road poramboke and the fifth defendant contended that the suit property belongs to him. The Trial Court found that the suit property is not a road poramboke. Nevertheless, the suit was dismissed holding that the suit for possession based on previous possession is not maintainable against the fifth defendant who is the true owner of the property. According to the Trial Court, a suit for possession on the strength of previous possession is maintainable against the true owner only if the same is instituted in accordance with Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Though the matter was taken up in appeal by the plaintiff, the Appellate Court confirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The legal representatives of the plaintiff, who are aggrieved by the concurrent decisions against them, have thus come in this second appeal.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants as also the learned counsel for the fifth respondent.

3. A person in possession of a property and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership is presumed to have perfect title over the property against the whole world except the true owner. In the event of disturbance of the said possession by a third party, the person in possession can certainly maintain a suit for possession. Article 64 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act deals with suits based on previous possession when a party while in possession of the property has been dispossessed. The period of limitation prescribed for such suits under Article 64 is 12 years from the date of dispossession. Article 64 is restricted to suits for possession at the instance of persons who having been in possession and having subsequently lost the possession either by dispossession or discontinuance. In a suit for possession based on previous possession, if the defendant raises the question of title, the plaintiff must establish a better title to succeed in the suit. [See Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, 1968 KHC 280 : AIR 1968 SC 1165 : 1968 KLT 182 : 1968 KLJ 176 : 1968 (3) SCR 163]. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is an exception to the said principle. The policy behind Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is to provide a quicker and summary remedy for persons who are dispossessed of immovable properties. As clarified in Section 6(4) of the said Act, a suit under Section 6 will not preclude the defendant from recovering the property based on title. In other words, a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is maintainable even against the true owner of the property. The reme