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2015 Supreme(Ker) 1316

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA
P.R. Ramachandra Menon, K. Harilal, JJ.
M. Nanikutty - Appellant
Vs.
T.C. Mukunda and Ors. - Respondents
Arb. A. No. 9 of 2004
Decided On : 14-10-2015

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Kaleeswaram Raj
For the Respondents: V.R. Kesava Kaimal, N.M. Madhu, Sarvothaman K.P., P. Janardhanan, P Narayanan

Headnote:

Arbitration Act, 1940 - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Extension of prescribed period in certain cases - Agreement - Amendment - Applicability of Provision - Issue relates to the affairs of a partnership firm and the course and proceedings pursued with regard to the determination of rights and liberties - Held, In view of the black and white difference in the factual position, to be governed by the different provisions of law at the relevant point of time - Not find it necessary to have issue referred to Full Bench, as provision is crystal clear and scope of judgment passed by Supreme Court is very much discernible as clarified by Apex Court in subsequent decision in Essar Construction's case ((2000) 6 SCC 94) - Section 5 is applicable to the proceedings under Arbitration Act, 1940, after the Amendment.

JUDGMENT :

P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J.

1. These appeals/revision arise from a common order dated 20.03.2003 passed by the Subordinate Judges' Court, Thalassery in I.A. Nos. 1503, 1504, 1505 and 1506 of 1999 preferred in O.P. No. 72/1992. The issue relates to the affairs of a partnership firm and the course and proceedings pursued with regard to the determination of rights and liberties. It is stated that the firm was originally constituted with two partners. Huge financial assistance was availed by the firm from the Kerala Financial Corporation and also the State Bank of India, creating mortgage of the property having an extent of 18 cents. Pursuant to the coercive steps taken by the financial institutions, steps were taken to see that private sale was arranged in some or other manner to save the property and further assets. It was in the course of the said proceedings, that the partnership was sought to be widened by inducting two more partners and a Deed was executed accordingly. As per the agreement executed among the parties, by name Nanikutty, Janardhanan, Mukundan and Krishnakumar, it is stated that the entire liability was to be taken over by Mukundan upon which, the property and the building would stand conveyed to the name of Mr. Mukundan. It was also stated as agreed by Mukundan to give some additional monetary consideration to the other partners, in relation to their rights and interests and that the matter could be pursued accordingly.

2. The contention of the party, who filed the Arbitration O.P. before the court below, appears to be that he had satisfied the requirements in terms of the agreement enshouldering the entire liability and also by effecting payment to the concerned partners, despite which the conveyance was not effected in his name transferring the rights over the property and the building. The stand taken by the above petitioner was rebutted by the other persons concerned and this led to a dispute. Under the said circumstance, the party to the Arbitration O.P. approached the court below by filing O.P. No. 72/1992, as mentioned above.

3. In the course of further proceedings, an Arbitrator was appointed, who submitted a report before the court below. As per the said report, the property and the building were to be conveyed to the name of Mr. Mukundan and the amounts to the specified extent were to be given to the concerned partners. This was to the chagrin of the appellants by name Nanikutty and Janardhanan, who filed separate petitions to set aside the Award which are accompanied with a petition to condone the delay in filing the same. I.A. Nos. 1503 & 1504 of 1999 were the petitions filed by Nanikutty: while I.A. Nos. ISOS & 1506 of 1999 were filed by Janardhanan.

4. The petition to condone the delay was vehemently opposed from the opposite side and same was the position with regard to the petition to set aside the Award. The objections filed by the opposite side in the concerned interlocutory applications to set aside the Award was mainly with reference to non-applicability of Section 16 of the 'old Act' and the non-existence of the grounds under the said Act (The Arbitration Act, 1940). Genuineness of the reasons stated in the affidavit was also attacked. In the course of further proceedings, evidence was adduced from the part of the applicants by examining P.Ws. 1 and 2. The contention was that no copy of the Award was served to them and they came to know about passing of the Award only in the second week of December 1998.

5. The Award was in fact passed on 5.11.1998 and the same was filed before the court only on 13.11.1998. It was stated that the appellants got a copy of the Award only on 23.12.1998 and thereafter, instructions were given to the concerned lawyer to have it challenged by the first week of January 1999. The parties contended that the concerned lawyer was 'out of station' for the period from 7.2.1999 to 10.3.1999' and hence the proceedings could be filed only by 12.3.1999. It was in the s




























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