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KERALA HIGH COURT
K. Hema, J.
C.V. Suresh - Appellant
Versus
Tobin (Minor) & Anr. - Respondents
R.S.A. No. 725 of 2003
Decided On : 05-09-2011
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 54 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 3, 59, 61 and 62 - 'contents of documents' - Main controversy in suit is relating to payment of price for alleged sale - As per the averments in plaint, he sold plaint schedule property in favour of first plaintiff (who is his sister's son and a minor) vide registered sale deed. Thereafter, first plaintiff and second plaintiff (minor's father) are in possession of plaint schedule property, which is having an extent of 5 cents of property - Defendant started interfering in plaintiffs' peaceful enjoyment of property and suit was filed for permanent prohibitory injunction from trespass, obstruction to enjoyment of the property etc - Whether Payment of price for sale is disputed, can such fact be proved by mere production and marking of a registered sale deed - Is it an a fact stated or narrated in a document be proved by mere production and marking of the document or Is it necessary to adduce oral evidence to prove such fact? What is meant by 'contents of documents' for the purpose of Sections 59, 61 and 62 of Evidence Act - Is there any difference between 'contents of documents' and 'facts' stated in the document - Is there any bar under Section 91 or Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to adduce oral evidence to prove payment of price for sale or existence of sale of property - Held, Mere production of document will not prove existence of the "facts" stated in the document, even though it will prove that the document contains "statement of fact" referring to such fact or facts - Where a buyer pays price for the sale to the seller and such fact is stated in a document, the said fact of payment of price has to be proved by oral evidence - Mere production of a document will not prove the facts stated in the document - If payment of price for the sale is disputed and it is in issue, mere admission of execution of a sale deed which contains a narration of a past or future event of payment of price for the sale will not prove that there was payment - Such fact cannot be proved by mere production and marking of a sale deed - The "facts" stated in the "contents of documents" do not constitute substantive evidence for proving existence of such facts and disputed facts cannot be resolved by merely interpreting the recitals in the document in the absence of oral evidence on such facts - If no such payment is proved, there will be no sale at all. If there is no sale, there can be no "terms" for sale. "Terms" of sale pre-supposes existence of sale. Therefore, payment of price for sale is not "terms" of sale, but it may be a legal requirement to constitute sale itself - Section 92 has no independent existence but it applies only to cases to which S.91 applies. S.92 will apply only to cases to which S.91 applies and "terms" have been proved as stated in Section 91 of Evidence Act - The bar is to oral evidence to disprove the terms of a contract, and not to disprove the contract itself" - Taking all these facts into consideration, I hold that going by the language of Sections 91 and 92 of Evidence Act, there is no bar to adduce oral evidence to prove payment of price for the sale or the very existence of sale.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
Admissibility of Evidence in Sale Transactions:
The mere production and marking of a registered sale deed (Ext.A-1) does not automatically prove the payment of the sale consideration or the existence of a sale. Such facts require proof through oral evidence, especially when the payment of price is disputed (!) (!) .
Difference Between "Contents of Documents" and "Facts":
The "contents of a document" refer to the visible, perceivable elements contained within the document, such as writing, figures, or signatures. In contrast, "facts" stated or narrated in the document are statements referring to actual events or conditions, which cannot be established solely by inspection of the document (!) (!) .
Proof of Payment of Price:
If payment of the sale consideration is disputed, it must be proved by direct oral evidence. The recitals in a sale deed indicating payment are only statements of fact and do not constitute substantive proof of payment unless corroborated by oral evidence from persons who perceived the payment (!) (!) (!) .
Legal Principles on Evidence:
The "facts" stated within a document are not automatically proved by the document's production; they require direct oral evidence for establishment when in dispute (!) (!) (!) .
Interpretation of Recitals in Documents:
Recitals or statements contained within a document are not substantive evidence of the actual facts. They can be interpreted to understand the context or to aid oral evidence but do not alone prove the truth of the facts stated. The court cannot rely solely on recitals to establish disputed facts (!) (!) .
Legal Scope of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act:
These sections restrict the use of oral evidence to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of a document when the terms are proved as per Section 91. However, they do not bar evidence regarding the existence of a sale or the fact of payment if such facts are in dispute. The prohibition applies mainly to "terms" of the disposition, not the existence of the transaction itself (!) (!) (!) .
Burden of Proof:
When the existence of a sale or payment is disputed, the burden lies on the party asserting the sale to prove the payment of consideration through direct oral evidence. The absence of such evidence weakens the claim, even if the sale deed is admitted or produced (!) (!) (!) .
Implication of Disputed Facts:
The courts below erred by relying solely on the recitals in the sale deed to conclude payment, without examining oral evidence. Such reliance is illegal and constitutes a legal error, as the facts of payment must be proved by admissible oral evidence when in dispute (!) (!) .
Impact on Title and Sale Validity:
Without proper proof of payment, the sale cannot be established, which undermines the validity of the transfer of ownership. Consequently, the foundation for claims of ownership or rights over the property based solely on a disputed sale deed is invalid (!) .
Final Court Decision:
The appellate court found that the lower courts' findings were vitiated by illegalities, particularly their improper reliance on the recitals in the sale deed without supporting oral evidence. As a result, the decree confirming the sale was set aside, and the suit was dismissed (!) (!) .
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K. Hema, J. - If payment of price for sale is disputed, can such fact be proved by mere production and marking of a registered sale deed? Is it necessary to adduce oral evidence to prove such fact? Is there any bar under Section 91 or, Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ('Evidence Act', for short) to adduce oral evidence to prove payment of price for sale or existences of sale of property?
2. Can a fact stated or narrated in a document to proved by mere production and marking of the document? If necessary to adduce oral evidence to prove such fact? what is meant by "contents of documents" for the purpose of section 59, 61 and 62 of Evidence Act? Is there any difference between "contents of documents" and "facts" stated in the document? These are some of the substantial questions of law to be considered in this second appeal.
3. Facts briefly:
The sole defendant is the appellant in this appeal. As per the averments in the plaint, he sold plaint schedule property in favour of first plaintiff (who is his sister's son and a minor) vide Ext.A 1-registered sale-deed. Thereafter, first plaintiff and second plaintiff (minor's father) are in possession of plaint schedule property, which is having an extent of 5 cents of property. The defendant, however, started interfering in plaintiffs' peaceful enjoyment of the property and hence, the suit was filed for permanent prohibitory injunction from trespass, obstruction to enjoyment of the property etc. (The suit is filed by PW-1, who is the mother of first plaintiff).
4. The defendant filed written statement and admitted execution of Ext.A-l, but, according to him, Ext.A-1 is not a sale deed. No sale consideration was paid for the alleged sale. Ext.A-1 is only a gift deed, which was later revoked as per Ext.A3-cancellation deed, after issuing sufficient notice to first plaintiff. There is no attesting witnesses to Ext.A-1. It was executed at the request of his sister (PW 1). Even if Ext.A-1 is construed as "gift deed", it is invalid since it contravenes Sections 123, 59 and 3 of Transfer of Property Act ('the T.P. Act' for short) and Section 16 of the Contract Act. The defendant is the absolute owner of the property and he is in possession of the property. He is paying basic tax for the property.
5. The plaintiffs are not in possession of the plaint schedule property. The property is not identifiable either by description in the schedule in Ext.A-1 or in the plaint. It is a part of an extent of property consisting of 49 cents of land. After filing the written statement, plaint was amended, inter alia, stating that since the transaction is only a sale, it cannot be revoked as per Ext.A-3. After execution of sale deed-Ext.A-1, defendant has no right over the property. Ext.A-3 is null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. Since Ext.A-3 would cast a cloud ontl title of first plaintiff over plaint schedule property, a declaration is sought for that Ext. A-1 is null and void.
6. The main issues framed by trial court are whether Ext.A-1 is a sale deed or a gift deed and whether first plaintiff obtained title over plaint schedule property by virtue of Ext.A-l. Both the courts below interpreted the recitals in Ext.A-l (mainly a particular vernacular expression contained in the said document) and concurrently held that Ext.A-1 is a sale deed. It was also held that sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 12,000/- and that it was 'paid' to defendant; 'received' by him, but he 'gave up' the amount.
7. The trial court also held that since Ext.A-l is a sale-deed, execution of Ext.A3- cancellation deed executed by defendant is of no consequence. On the above findings, a decree was granted by Munsiff Court, declaring that Ext.A-3 is null and void and not binding on the first plaintiff or his right over the plaint schedule property. A decree of permanent prohibitory injunction was also granted against trespass etc., as prayed for. The said decree and judgment were confirmed in appeal by the Distric
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