P. Bhavadasn, J.

Under challenge is Ext.P8 order dated 17.2.2007 of the Sub Court, Kozhikode, whereby the said court dismissed I.A. 5838 of 2006 in O.S.647 of 1995.

2. That was a petition to amend the schedule of the plaint, decree and other records by correcting the village and desom.

3. The petitioners before this court are the decree holders in O.S.647 of 1995 before the Sub Court, Kozhikode, which had a checkered carrier. The suit was one for specific performance which was decreed by the trial court. In appeal, this court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. The aggrieved plaintiff carried the matter in appeal before the Apex Court and the Apex Court allowed the appeal and restored the decree of the trial court and the decision is reported in Brahmanand v. Muthugopal (2005(4) K.L.T. 809).

4. The decree was put in execution. In pursuance to the decree, a sale deed was executed through court and the decree holder sought for registration of the sale deed. When he approached the Registrar's office, he was told that the village shown is wrong, i.e. the property is actually situated in Nagaram Village, whereas the property is shown in Kasaba village in the decree as well as in the plaint. This necessitated the petitioner to move a petition for correction of plaint, decree etc. so as to bring it in conformity with Ext.P4 certificate granted by the Village Officer showing that the property falls within Nagaram village.

5. That petition was opposed by the respondents herein on the ground that since the decree of the trial court has been confirmed by the Apex Court, any amendment to the decree etc. can be carried out only in the Apex Court and the trial court was not competent to entertain the petition.

6. The trial court, mainly relying on the decisions reported in Kannan v. Narayani (1980 K.L.T. 9) and Thomas v. Kunjamma (ILR 2005(4) K.L.T. 185) held that only the Apex Court had powers to amend the decree, plaint etc. and dismissed the petition.

7. Shri. P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners before this court pointed out that the court below has misdirected itself both on facts and in law. It omitted to note that the decree is one for specific performance and the trial court continues to retain control over the matter even after the suit is disposed of. It was pointed out that the trial court is clothed with powers under Sections 22 and 28 of the Specific Relief Act to grant appropriate reliefs even after the suit is disposed of by the trial court or is confirmed in appeal by the appellate court. It was also contended that the decree for specific performance is infact a preliminary decree and therefore the trial court retains power to carry out necessary amendments so as to do justice between the parties. For the above proposition, learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in Kumar Dhirendra Mullick v. Tivolipark Apartments (P) Ltd. ((2005) 9 SCC 262), Abdhu v. Assainar (1993 (2) K.L.T. 711) and Krishnan v. Mohammed (2006(1) K.L.T. 156).

8. Learned counsel went on to contend that following the principles laid down in the above decisions, the suit in the present case being one for specific performance, even after the decree is passed and confirmed in appeal, the doctrine of merger applies only to a certain extent and the trial court retains the power to correct clerical or such other accidental errors which might have occurred in the proceedings. It was also contended that the trial court has got all ancillary powers to entertain the application for amendment and being a procedural matter, the trial court retains the power to do justice between the parties.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand pointed out that in view of the decision reported in Kannan's case (supra) and Thomas's case (supra) which rely on the decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that the power to allow amendments once the trial court decree merges with the appel