N.K. Balakrishnan, J.

Defendants I to 3 in a suit for recovery of possession are the appellants. During the pendency of the appeal the first appellant died. His legal representatives were impleaded as supplemental appellants. The suit was for declaration of title and for recovery o possession.

2. The plaint schedule property measures 43 cents. It is comprised in Sy. No. 493/4 0 Neyyattinkara Village. Originally it belonged to Bhagavathi Pillai and Govinda Pillai. The mortgaged the property to one Subramaniyan Nadar and Kunjan Nadar as per Ext. Al mortgage deed of 1113 M.E. (corresponding to 1938). On the other hand the appellants would contend that Bhagavathi Pillai and Govinda Pillai had earlier executed a lease deed in respect of the plaint schedule property and other properties in favour of one Raman Nadar and Kochappy Nadar in 1107 as per Ext. B 1 who assigned that right to Nelson Nadar in 1972 as per document No. 1629/1972. It is their further case that Nalson Nadal mentioned above assigned his lease hold right to Jeevanayakam in 1972 as evidenced by Ext.B2. The learned counsel or the plaintiffs would submit that Ext. B I lease deed has nothing to do with the plaint schedule property since the survey number mentioned therein is totally different. But the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that in Ext.A I itself there is a recital regarding the earlier lease in favour of Raman Nadar. It is further contended that since the lease was not determined there were litigation's between the parties and ultimately in order to avoid the litigation's, the father and mother of the plaintiffs sold the property in 1974 to defendants 3 and 4 on their own behalf and on behalf of the plaintiff, she being represented by her mother as guardian. Ext. B5 is that sale deed dated 19-8-1974. According to the plaintiff, her father and mother were in direct possession of the property on the strength of Ext. A2 - the assignment deed of 1942 and it was because they were in possession of the property they executed Ext. A5 gift deed to the plaintiff and Thankappan Nadar, her `would be husband' on 2-7-1973.

3. PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exhibits A I to A9 were marked. DW I was examined on the side of the defendant and Exhibits B 1 to B9 were marked. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, but the lower appellate granted a decree as sought for. The learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the finding of the lower appellate court on various grounds.

4. The following substantial questions of law have been re-framed:

(i). Was the gift deed executed by the plaintiffs father, in favour of the plaintiff and Thankappan Nadar, accepted and acted upon?

(ii). Did the lower appellate court go wrong in holding that the gift, so far as it relates to Thankappan Nadar, was also accepted when he himself repudiated the gift'?

(iii). Did the lower appellate court go wrong in holding that the release deed executed by Thankappan Nadar would itself prove acceptance of the gift without properly interpreting the terms of the document and bearing in mind the context in which the said document was executed?

(iv). Did the lower appellate court go wrong in not properly interpreting Section 125 of the Transfer of Property Act?

(v). Is not the sale deed executed by the plaintiff's father and mother valid, even though the mother acts as the guardian of the minor plaintiff, but the father was also one of the two executants of that document?

5. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that Ext. AS gift deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff and her `would be husband'. It was a 'Sthridhana property'. Admittedly, their marriage did not take place. Since it was only a conditional gift and since the condition was not fulfilled (as the marriage did not take place) the gift was not acted upon and that was why Thankappan Nadar released his right as per Ext.A6 dated 11-10-1973. The learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent would submit that the cont