Applications preferred by the petitioners for registration of their lands under the Malabar Land Registration Act, 1895 ('the Act' for short) have been rejected as per communications impugned in these writ petitions on the ground that the Act is not in force. The writ petitions are preferred contending that the Act is in force and that therefore, the applications preferred by the petitioners should have been considered in accordance with the Act. The short question, therefore, is whether the Act is in force as, claimed by the petitioners.

2. The Act provides for registration of proprietors of estates in the erstwhile Malabar and Wayanad areas of the State, for securing the public revenue in a summary manner. It is admitted by both sides that by virtue of the provisions contained in the Kerala Repealing and Amending Ordinance, 2005 ('the Ordinance'), the Act has been repealed. The case of the petitioners is that the said Ordinance has not been replaced by an Act of the legislature and as such, the same ceased to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature, as provided for under Article 213(2) of the Constitution. The case of the respondents, on the other hand, is that the repeal effected by the Ordinance is permanent, though the ordinance was a temporary statute.

3. Heard Sri.V.R.K.Kaimal and Sri P.M.Paulose, the learned counsel for the petitioners as also Sri.Aravindakumar Babu, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decisions in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378, Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2003(3) KLT 267 and State of U.P. v. Dinkar Sinha, (2007) 10 SCC 548, in support of their contention. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in The State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose and others, AIR 1962 SC 945, T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P., (1985) 3 SCC 198, and State of Haryana v. Amar Nath Bansal, (1997) 10 SCC 700, in support of his contention.

5. I have examined the contentions raised by the parties. As noted above, the fact that the Act has been repealed by the Ordinance is not in dispute. The issue is whether the Act revived on the expiration of the period specified in Article 213(2) of the Constitution. An identical issue arose for consideration before the Apex Court in The State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (supra). In the said case, an election held as per the provisions of the Orissa Muncipality Act was held to be invalid by the High Court of Orissa on the ground that the electoral rolls prepared were not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. To overcome the said decision, the Governor of Orissa promulgated an ordinance validating the electoral rolls and the election, which were held to be bad by the court. The said ordinance was not replaced by an Act as in the instant case. An issue arose consequently as to whether the validation of the electoral rolls and the election made by the ordinance would survive after the period specified in Article 213(2) of the Constitution. The Apex Court, relying on Steavenson v. Oliver [(1841) 151 ER 1024], held that no inflexible rule can be laid down about the effect of the expiration of a temporary statute and that in some cases the repeal effected by a temporary statute would be permanent and would endure even after the expiration of the temporary statute. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the said judgment read thus:

21. In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the general rule about the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act on which Mr. Cherry relies is inflexible and admits of no exceptions. It is true for instance that offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act. expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, it will ipso facto terminate. But is that an inflexible and universal rule?