1. This revision petition is directed against an Order passed by the executing court on a petition for effecting delivery of property pursuant to a final decree passed in a suit for partition.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the contesting parties.

3. In a suit for partition filed by the respondents against one Najumuneesa, the sole defendant, a preliminary decree was passed on 30-09-2009 directing to divide the properties into metes and bounds. Later, the respondents filed a final decree application and an order was passed thereon on 30-05-2014, allotting separate portions of the properties to the parties. Subsequently, the original defendant assigned her rights to the revision petitioner, who was impleaded as respondent in the execution petition. It is the contention of the revision petitioner that since the second respondent was a minor at the inception of the suit and continued to be so even at the time of passing a final decree, the first respondent (mother of the minor) could not have acted as legal guardian of the second respondent on the basis of the prescriptions under Mohamedan Law. For that sole reason, the execution petition is not maintainable in law. According to the revision petitioner, the first respondent is not competent to represent the minor second respondent under the personal law applicable to the parties. In the absence of any guardian appointed for the minor second respondent, the execution petition is liable to be dismissed.

4. The executing court rightly repelled this contention. Hence this revision petition questioning some basic legal tenets.

5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued with reference to Mulla's Principles of Mohamedan Law that legal guardians of the property of a Muslim minor are (1) the father (2) the executor appointed by the father's Will (3) the father's father and (4) the executor appointed by the Will of the father's father. It is also contended that mother is only a defacto guardian of the Muslim minor. It is a well settled principle of Mohamedan Law that a defacto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of a minor. This proposition has been eminently enunciated for the first time in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi ((1918) 45 I.A 73). Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Mohd.Amin and others v. Vakil Ahmad and others (A.I.R 1952 S.C 358) unequivocally declared the law in the following terms:

“Under the Muhammadan Law a person who has charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, and who may, therefore, be conveniently called a “defacto guardian”, has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immovable property which the transferee can enforce against the infant.”

6. The court went to the extend of laying down thus:

“A deed of settlement which is thus void qua the minor is void altogether qua all the parties including those who were sui juris.”

7. Fact that the persons mentioned above are the legal guardians of a Muslim minor is beyond any pale of dispute. Further, mother of a Muslim minor is only a defacto guardian and that she is incompetent to deal with any immovable property of the minor are unchallengeable propositions. But those principles are applicable only to private alienations. It will not have any impact on a decree passed in a properly instituted suit. In the given case, the legal question is entirely different. None of the above mentioned Mohamedan Law principles applies to the case in hand as the situation is totally different.

8. The suit was filed against the assignor of the revision petitioner by the first respondent in her personal right as a sharer as well as in the capacity as next friend of her minor child, who is also a sharer. Nobody can dispute the proposition that the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') and especially the provisions in Order XXXII of the Code are secular in nature. In other words, the provisions therein apply to all t