The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the definition of 'worker' under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the application of this definition to determine the worker's rights and entitlements.

K. Harilal, J.

1. The petitioner is the Managing Director of a private limited company, by name Shelter Finance and Chitties Limited, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and the 1st respondent was an employee, allegedly working as Branch Manager. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent was appointed in the Company, as Clerk in the year 1996 and subsequently, she was promoted as Branch Manager, Chavakkad Branch and as such she was controlling the activities of the branch, including supervision of other workers and the works carried out by them. While so, the petitioner initiated disciplinary action against the 1st respondent, alleging that she had granted two gold loans, Loan Nos. 218/2006 and 219/2006 of Rs. 13,500/- to one 'V.D. Roy' on 22.04.2006, without any security. The 1st respondent denied the allegations levelled against her and eventually the matter was culminated in an industrial dispute, before the Industrial Tribunal, Palakkad. On receipt of the reference order, the Tribunal registered the industrial dispute as I.D. No. 66 of 2008 and proceeded with trial. During the course of trial, MW1 and MW2 were examined and M1 to M14 were marked for the management and WW1 was examined and W1 to W8 were marked for the worker. After considering the evidence on record, the Tribunal passed an award holding that the dismissal of the worker is not justifiable and she is entitled to receive from the Management a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- towards compensation. The legality and propriety of the reasons, whereby the Tribunal passed an award, are under challenge in this writ petition.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

3. The Learned counsel for the petitioner advanced arguments, assailing the finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the 1st respondent was not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent was working as Branch Manager, having supervision over the subordinate employees and works done by them. But, the Tribunal miserably failed to appreciate the evidence on record in the correct perspective.

4. Secondly, it is contended that there are sufficient materials to show that the 1st respondent had granted two loans, without obtaining sufficient security. But, the Tribunal went wrong in appreciating the evidence in its correct perspective.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent advanced arguments to justify the finding of the Tribunal that the 1st respondent is only a worker coming under the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act. It is also contended that there is no sufficient materials to bring home the misconduct alleged against the 1st respondent and the Tribunal can be justified in granting compensation, instead of directing the petitioner to reinstate the 1st respondent in service.

6. The short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is, whether there is any illegality, impropriety or any kind of perversity in any of the findings, whereby the Tribunal passed the impugned award, directing the petitioner to pay compensation.

7. At the outset, it is to be remembered that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not sitting in appeal over the award passed by the Tribunal. The scope and extent of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is confined to the legality, impropriety or perversity, in the appreciation of evidence or in the application of law only. Going by the impugned award, it is seen that the Tribunal has rightly framed the issue, whether the dismissal of the respondent being a staff of the petitioner is justifiable? If not, what relief she is entitled to get. Thereafter, the Tribunal has framed two points for consideration, firstly, whether the 1st respondent is a worker defined under Section 2(s) of the Act and whether the worker is guil