The petitioner has approached this Court aggrieved by Ext.P4 preliminary order passed by the Labour Court in I.D.No.25/2015, pursuant to a dispute raised, at the instance of a workman under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The dispute raised by the workman was in connection with the termination of his service on the ground of an alleged misconduct that was proved against him, in a domestic enquiry conducted by the management. In Ext.P4 order, the Labour Court, which considered the issue of validity of the enquiry as a preliminary issue, proceeded to find that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer was vitiated by the principles of natural justice, and, hence, was liable to be set aside. It is against the said preliminary order that the petitioner management has chosen to approach this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned counsel for the respondent.

3. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as also the submissions made across the bar, I find from a perusal of Ext.P4 order that the petitioner management had, in their written statement filed before the Labour Court, clearly indicated that it was reserving its right to conduct a de novo enquiry against the workman in the event of the Labour Court holding that the enquiry, that was already conducted, was vitiated through a non-compliance with the rules of natural justice or other reasons. In the light of the said stand of the petitioner management before the Labour Court, I am of the view that the mere passing of Ext.P4 order, as a preliminary order, finding that the enquiry conducted by the management, which resulted in the disciplinary action initiated against the workman, was vitiated on account of a non-compliance with the rules of natural justice, need not be seen as prejudicial to the management, at this stage of the proceedings before the Labour Court. It is always open to the petitioner management to either seek permission for conducting a fresh enquiry against the workman, or to proceed further with the proceedings before the Labour Court, for justifying the punishment that has been imposed on the workman, based on the misconduct that stood proved against him in the enquiry. In the latter event, it would always be open to the petitioner management to challenge the final award passed by the Labour Court, before this Court, in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. I note, in this connection, that the aforesaid view is consistent with the declaration of law by the Supreme Court in The Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe - [AIR 1975 SC 1900] and D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn. and Others - [1983 KHC 514]. In the latter decision, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that High Courts in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not stop proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. The rationale for the said decision appears to be the finding that neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 should be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait, to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait, by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding a decision on issues more vital to them. The decision was therefore rendered keeping in mind the interest of the workman in a dispute involving the services of the workman under the management. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on a Division Bench decision of this Court in St. Thomas Missions Hospital v. State of Kerala and Another - [2007 (1) KHC 583], which states that the decision of the Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering (Supra) is not to be treated as a cast iron proposition to be applied in all cases, I note f