Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

The Manager of a private school filed the captioned writ petition challenging a common order under Section 4 of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972, for short, "the Act", issued in favour of the private respondents who are teachers of that school, hereinafter, "teachers". The learned single judge refused to grant interim relief as sought for by the writ petitioner. Hence the Manager's captioned writ appeal. Having regard to the question of law involved in this case, the Bench acceded to the request of both sides that the writ petition be withdrawn to be heard by the Division Bench, along with the writ appeal. Today, we have heard the learned counsel for the Manager and the teachers.

2. The short issue for decision is as to whether a private school which is not aided by the Government, is an 'establishment' as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act and whether a teacher of such a school is an 'employee' as defined in Section 2(a) of that Act.

3. The learned counsel for the Manager argued, firstly, that a school does not fall within the term 'establishment' and a teacher of a school does not fall within the definition of the term 'employee' in the Act. The second argument is that the application under Section 4 of the Act was filed only on 15.10.2012, though the teachers stood dismissed w.e.f. 14.03.2011, the date of their suspension from service and hence, there was no jural relationship in tact, to sustain a claim for payment of subsistence allowance under the Act. The learned counsel for the teachers supported the impugned order and criticized the Manager's writ petition as an oppression of legitimate statutory rights to sustenance.

4. At the outset, we note that the order of suspension of the teachers was issued on 14.03.2011; the applications under Section 4 of the Act were filed on 15.10.2012 and the order of dismissal of the teachers was issued on 12.02.2013, stated to be retrospectively from 15.10.2012.

5. Keeping aside the question whether there could have been a dismissal of the teachers with retrospective effect, we proceed to consider whether a dismissed employee could apply under Section 4, provided he is or was an employee covered by the Act. An application under Section 4 of the Act can be made even after the death of the employee, by the legal representatives of the deceased employee as well. Even in the case of a deceased employee, the eligibility to payment of subsistence allowance is not extinguished by that employee's demise, but would accrue in favour of his/her legal representatives, by the operation of the contents of Section 3 of the Act, for reasons that we elaborate now. Sub-section 1 of Section 3 provides for payment by the employer. That is to be effected whenever an employee is placed under suspension. Such payment has to be made for the period during which the employee is under suspension. The rate of subsistence allowance is also prescribed in that sub-section. The net effect of these provisions is that the eligibility, entitlement, quantum and the right to recover get crystalised as and when a person is placed under suspension. That right continues to run and keeps on accruing so long as the person is under suspension. It is that accrued right which is found on the basis of an application invoking Section 4 for recovery of money due from the employer. Therefore, what is sought to be recovered by making an application under Section 4 of the Act, is money, rightly and legitimately accrued and due to an employee by the operation of Section 3 of the Act.

6. The only embargo for the recovery of the aforenoted amount can be a bar to recovery created by any statutory provision. The right does not get barred, though the remedy may get barred by efflux of time, going by any prescribed period of limitation as to time for institution of proceedings for recovery. Section 4, firstly, protects all other modes of recovery. The procedure prescribed in Section 4