Thomas P. Joseph, J.

1. These Second Appeals arise from the separate judgments and decrees passed by the learned Principal Sub Judge, Kochi in A.S. Nos. 79 of 2005 and 64 of 2007 and of learned Additional Munsiff, Kochi in OS Nos. 473 of 2004 and 28 of 2006. RSA No. 835 of 2007 is filed by the plaintiffs 1 to 5 in OS No. 473 of 2004. That is a suit for recovery of possession of the suit property on the strength of the title plaintiffs claim over the suit property as per Ext. A1, assignment deed dated 10/10/2001. Learned Munsiff dismissed the suit which the First Appellate Court has confirmed. Hence RSA No. 835 of 2007.

2. The defendant in OS No. 473 of 2004 along with his mother filed OS No. 28 of 2006 for a decree for specific performance of Ext. B2, agreement for sale dated 27/11/1995 said to be executed by the late Velappan, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs in OS No.473 of 2004. The Trial Court dismissed the suit against which plaintiffs in OS No. 28 of 2006 preferred AS No 64 of 2007. The First Appellate Court allowed that appeal and granted a decree for specific performance of Ext. B2, agreement for sale. The defendants in OS No. 28 of 2006 have filed RSA No. 123 of 2009.

3. In RSA No. 825 of 2007, the following substantial question of law is framed:

When the Scheme by which plaint schedule property was assigned specifically prohibits transfer of the property for a period of twenty years, whether, Ext. B2, agreement for sale of the said property is valid as any transfer in violation of public policy is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and if so, whether on the, strength of Ext. B2, Courts below were justified in non-suiting the plaintiff granting benefit under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act?

4. In RSA No. 123 of 2009, following are the substantial Questions of law framed:

(i) Whether the lower Appellate Court is justified in interfering with the well reasoned judgment of the Trial Court without a definite finding as to whether or not the Trial Court went wrong in any legal or factual aspects?

(ii) Whether or not in a suit for specific performance which is a discretionary remedy, the Appellate Court has power or jurisdiction to upset the findings of the Trial Court in the absence of a finding by the Appellate Court that the finding of the Trial Court was in any manner perverse or without any evidence at all?

(iii) Is the restriction in respect of alienation of a property for a specific period transferred under a specific scheme of a public authority invalid for any reason and form what point of time the said restriction will start operate under the law?

(iv) Whether or not an agreement for specific performance in respect of a properly in which the executant's had no saleable right as on the date of agreement can give rise to a cause of action for specific performance under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act?

(v) Whether in view of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, limitation for suit for specific performance based on an agreement for sale which will operate only on fulfilment of specified event or condition will start from the date of occurrence or fulfilment of the said event or condition as the case may be?

5. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, I have today framed the following substantial question of law as well in RSA No. 123 of 2009:

"(vi) Whether Velappan, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had any heritable or assignable right in the suit property so that the agreement allegedly executed by him could be enforced against his legal representatives who claim to have acquired title of the property by Ext. A1, dated 10/10/2001 ?"

6. Facts necessary for a decision of the above substantial questions of law are:

Appellants are the legal representatives of the late Velappan, S/o. Thevan Kunjappan. Thevan Kunjappan was a scavenger of the Cochin Corporation (for short, "the Corporation). The Corporation purchased 1.65 acres of land to be distributed among the landle