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2018 Supreme(Ker) 58

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA
C.K. ABDUL REHIM, V. SHIRCY, JJ.
Hari Kumar – Appellant
Versus
M/S. Shriram Transport Finance Company Ltd. Thiruvananthapuram, Represented by Its Authorised Officer, K. Karthikeyan & Others - Respondents
Arbitration Appeal No. 1 of 2018
Decided On : 24-01-2018

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : V.G. Arun, Indulekha Joseph, Neeraj Narayan
For the Respondents: C. Harikumar

Headnote:Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Ss. 9 & 37 - As per section 9 of the act the language and usage of the word granting means the final adjudication of an application as the appeal filed against the interim order is held maintainable.

JUDGMENT :

C.K. Abdul Rehim, J.

1. An interim order passed by the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram in I.A.No.2351/2017 in O.P. (Arb) No. 398/2017 is under challenge at the instance of the 1st respondent before the court below. The 1st respondent herein had filed an original petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act seeking for appointment of an Advocate Receiver for taking possession of the vehicle bearing Registration No. KL-58-D-2979, which is allegedly hypothecated to the 1st respondent herein and to entrust that vehicle to them or in the alternative to pass appropriate directions for securing the claim amount of Rs.4,21,349/-, which is allegedly due from the appellant herein. Along with the original petition, the 1st respondent had filed I.A.No.2351/2017 seeking for appointment of an Advocate Receiver for taking possession of the vehicle and to entrust the same to them, in accordance with law or on the alternative to issue appropriate direction for securing the claim amount. By virtue of the impugned order passed on 31.8.2017, the District Court had appointed an Advocate Commissioner for taking possession of the vehicle. The appellant is challenging the said order on various grounds.

2. Heard; counsel for the appellant and counsel appearing for the 1st respondent. Since the order proposed to be passed in this appeal is not going to affect the 2nd respondent, we are inclined to dispose of the appeal at the stage of the admission itself, without issuing notice to the 2nd respondent.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that, the court below is lacking power to issue an order in the nature of the impugned one. It is further pointed out that, based on the impugned order the District Judge had issued a direction to the Advocate Commissioner to repossess the vehicle from the appellant and to hand over the same to the 1st respondent with the assistance of the local police station, if necessary. A copy of the order issued by the District Judge to the Advocate Commissioner is produced for our perusal. It is specifically stated therein that the Commissioner is directed to repossess the vehicle and to hand over the same to the petitioner in the application, with the assistance of local police station, if necessary.

4. The above appeal is resisted by the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent contending that, the appeal itself is not maintainable. It is further contended that the 1st respondent was entitled to repossess the vehicle and to sell it, in accordance with the terms of the hypothecation agreement executed between the parties and therefore the District Court was fully justified in issuing the order impugned herein.

5. At the first instance we may decide the question regarding maintainability of this appeal. Contention of the 1st respondent is that, an appeal under Section 37 of the Act is maintainable only against a final order issued under Section 9 of the Act. In support of such a contention learned counsel had cited a decision of the High Court of Karnataka reported as Symphony Services Corp. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Sudip Bhattacharjee [2008 (1) KarLJ 24]. It is held therein that an appeal under Section 37 of the Act is maintainable against an order granting or refusing any interim measure under Section 9 of the Act. The nomenclature or usage of the word 'granting' under Section 9 of the Act would necessarily mean only the final adjudication of an application under section 9 of the Act, is the finding. We are in respectful disagreement with the above proposition. It is true that Section 37 provides appeals from original decrees of the court passing any order granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9. The question is, whether an interim order passed in an original petition filed under Section 9 is outside the purview of “any measure under section 9” of the Act. It is trite law by this time that any order passed by the court under section 9 of the Act, whether it is final o









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