Dr. Kochu Thommen, J.

1. The petitioner is a Cooperative Society. The 2nd respondent was an employee of the society. A domestic enquiry was conducted against him on certain charges. On the basis of the finding of the enquiry officer, the employee was dismissed from the service of the society with effect from 12th August 1972. A dispute which soon arose as a result of the dismissal was referred under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the Industrial Tribunal, Calicut. The Tribunal by its award (Ext. P-3) dated 28th September 1976, set aside the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement of the employee. The Tribunal found that the domestic enquiry was defective and invalid as no notice of the enquiry had been duly served on the employee. The Tribunal further found that the charges against the employee were not proved.

2. The award is challenged by the society on three grounds. It is contended that the Tribunal failed to observe the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering Limited v. P. P. Mundhe 1975 (II) LLJ 379, in so far as it did not give an opportunity to the management to adduce evidence after the Tribunal came to a finding that the enquiry was not valid and proper. Secondly it is contended that the finding of the Tribunal as to the validity of the enquiry was perverse. Thirdly it is contended that the finding of the Tribunal on merits was also perverse.

3. Before the Tribunal it was contended by the employee that the enquiry conducted by the management was invalid and improper. The main ground of attack against the validity of the enquiry was that no notice of the enquiry was served on the employee and the cardinal principles of natural justice were therefore not observed. The employee testified as M.W. 1 to substantiate that contention. He further testified in support of his challenge against the merits of the order of the management. Nine documents were produced by him specifically in support of his contentions regarding the merits of the case. The employee further called upon the management to produce the minutes book and the day book; but they were not produced. It may be stated at this stage that the management did not raise any objection to the employee lending evidence on the merits of the case. On the contrary the management themselves chose to let in evidence on the merits. The Secretary of the Society as M.W. 1 testified at length on the merits of the case, apart from his testimony on the question of notice. The management produced twelve documents solely on the merits of their case against the employee. Certain other documents were also produced in support of their contention that due notice had been given to the employee. The Tribunal considered at length both the aspects of the case. It came to the conclusion that notice of the enquiry was not duly served on the employee. It further held that the management failed to substantiate the charges of misconduct against the employee.

4. Counsel for the petitioner, Shri K.R.B. Kaimal submits that the Tribunal ought to have come to a preliminary finding as to the validity of the enquiry before proceeding to consider the merits of the case. He says that, the Tribunal having come to a finding against the management on the question of validity of the enquiry, it ought to have given the management an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of the merits of their case against the employee. This, counsel says, is the principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering Limited v. P.P. Mundhe 1975 (II) LLJ 379 (supra). This contention is strongly refuted by Shri M. V. Joseph who appears for the employee. He points out that the principle stated by the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case, as sufficient opportunity had already been afforded to the management to adduce evidence in support of their case on merits.

5. In Cooper Engineering Limited v. P. P. Mundhe 1975 (II) LLJ 379 the question consid