2007 Supreme(Ker) 788
High Court of Kerala
Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.
Dhileep & Ors - Appellant
Versus
Debt Recovery Tribunal & Ors - Respondent
W.P.(C) No. 14165 of 2006
Decided On : 10-12-2007
Headnote:
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 - Sections 30(1) - Income Tax Act, 1961 - Schedule II Rule 11(4), Schedule II Rule 7(2) Entry 5 - What, if any, is the court fee payable on an appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, against an order of its Recovery Officer, deciding a claim or objection to attachment or sale - Held, Entry is inapplicable to an appeal against an order following an adjudication of an application under R.11(1) of the Schedule Rules - If that provision were to apply as it stands, the appealing claimant ought to be compelled to value the subject-matter of the appeal - Entry at Sl. in R.7(2) of the Procedure does not apply to an appeal, under S.30(1) of the R.D.B. Act, against orders passed on an adjudication of a claim under R.11(1) of the Schedule Rules - No court fee is leviable on such an appeal - Court quashed the impugned orders and directing that the appeals, filed by the petitioners, on which the impugned orders have been passed, shall be entertained without insisting on payment of any court fee - Writ Petitions Allowed.
Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. What, if any, is the court fee payable on an appeal to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, against an order of its Recovery Officer, deciding a claim or objection to attachment or sale?
W.P.(C) No.14165 of 2006
2. On the basis of different recovery certificates issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, for short, the "Tribunal", constituted under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the "RDB Act", proceedings were initiated against the properties involved in those cases. Petitioners who are not the debtors in terms of the recovery certificates, asserted independent title and filed claim petitions invoking R.11(4) of the II nd Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Schedule Rules". The Recovery Officer dismissed those petitions. Petitioners filed appeals under S.30(1) of the RDB Act. The Tribunal's Registry overruled the petitioners' answer to its objections on the question of court fee. The petitioners' appeals to the Tribunal against that, stand dismissed as per the impugned orders.
W.P. (C) No.18843 of 2006
3. The petitioner, a Municipality, on the ground that property tax is a first charge, under S.237 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, filed a claim petition under R.11 of the Schedule Rules asserting priority in matter of liabilities, in preference to the Bank, the holder of a recovery certificate. That was dismissed by the Recovery Officer. The appeal filed by the petitioner to the Tribunal has not been entertained on the ground of insufficiency of court fee for reasons similar to those stated in the order impugned in W.P.(C) No.14165 of 2006.
4. On behalf of the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.14165 of 2006, their learned counsel argued that they are not judgment debtors from whom any money is due, or has been found due, to the Bank. Accordingly, it is argued that there is no amount due from them and they have no financial liability under the transaction in question. It is pointed out that even as per the order of the Recovery Officer, dismissing the claim petitions, they are not saddled with any liability to pay any amount to the certificate holder and no monetary liability is imposed on the writ petitioners and hence an appeal against such an order cannot be construed as an appeal against an order imposing liability to pay amounts. The findings in the impugned decisions are criticized as based on an erroneous construction of R.7 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the "Procedure Rules", treating it as an all encompassing one. It is argued that the same is only a machinery provision which stipulates the rate of fee payable on an application and while R.7(2) does not provide for any particular kind of appeal, it is not open to the authority to otherwise inject into a statute, something that is not clearly provided for. Canvassing the position that provisions relating to levy of court fee are those imposing pecuniary liability and that therefore, any such restriction on a person's right to seek legal recourse has to be strictly construed, reference was made to the decision of the Apex Court in Lakshmi Ammal Vs. K.M. Madhavakrishnan & Ors. ((1978) 4 SCC 15)) holding that access to justice is the basis of the legal system and so, where there is a reasonable doubt, the benefit must go to him who says that the lesser court fee should be paid.
5. It is argued by the learned counsel appearing in W.P.(C) No.18843 of 2006 that the phrase "the amount appealed against" is referable only to a certificate holder or to a garnishee to whom notice has been issued under S.28 of the Act and does not refer to a person who does not have any liability whatsoever, for payment to the certificate holder. It is argued that the phrase "the amount appealed against" does not