P. Govindan Nair, J.

1. The question is whether the interest of a Marumakkathayi in the property of his tarwad is liable to attachment in execution of a decree for his personal debt. In C. R. P. No 619 of 1963 this question has to be answered with reference to the provisions of the Madras. Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Act XXII of 1933); in C. R. P. No. 1075 of 1962 with reference to those of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100; in C. R. P. No. 1120 of 1962 with reference to the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act, III of 1100; and in A. S. No. 179 of 1963 with reference to the provisions of the Cochin Nayar Act, XXIX of 1113.

2. Justice Vaidialingam before whom C. R. P. No. 1075 of 1962 came up felt that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Antherman v. Kannan 1960 KLT 1313 had cast doubt regarding the correctness of the earlier Full Bench decision in Bank of New India v. Ponnamma 1960 KLT 698. In Bank of New India v. Ponnamma, 1960 KLT 698, this Court ruled that the undivided interest of a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad governed by the Travancore Kshatriya Act, 1108 was liable to be attached and sold in execution of a personal decree obtained against him. The later Full Bench decision dealt with the question whether a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad, governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932, was entitled to transfer his undivided interest in the tarwad property and came to the conclusion that he was not entitled to do so.

3. Though the question that arose for decision in the earlier case related to an involuntary alienation and the latter to a voluntary alienation, the principle that should be applied in determining the question whether a member of a Marumakkathayam tarwad has such an interest in tarwad property as is transferable, or liable to be seized in execution of a decree, is the same.

4. A distinction, no doubt, has been drawn between the rights of a purchaser under a voluntary conveyance and those of a purchaser under an execution sale. That was in cases decided under the Hindu Mitakshara Law. ft is the principle or principles laid down in those decisions that have been developed, and at times applied to Marumakkathayis as well. It is therefore necessary to examine them and understand the rule in those cases to determine whether what is laid down therein must necessarily apply to, or may be usefully and properly adopted, as a part of Marumakkathayam Law. It is enough to refer to two early decisions of the Judicial Committee for this purpose for there has been little or no development of the law since those pronouncements.

5. The earliest decision of the Judicial Committee brought to our notice wherein this has been emphasised is that in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh IV Indian Appeals 247. The two learned Judges of the High Court who passed the decree therein under appeal had also decided another case, Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh 12 Beng. LR 90. Commenting on the decision in Mahabeer Persad's case, the Judicial Committee observed:

"The Court laid down in the strongest terms the law as established by the Full Bench ruling in Sadabart's Case, and other decisions, and appears to have assumed that a title acquired by means of an execution sale stood on no higher ground than one founded on a voluntary alienation.

It asserted, however, the power of imposing equitable terms upon the son, whom they held entitled to recover; and these terms were, in effect, that the property, when recovered, should be held and enjoyed by the family in defined shares; and that the share of the father, the judgment debtor, should be subject to the lien of the judgment creditor for the money advanced, with interest...."

6. The learned Judges of the High Court However refused to recognise any such 'equity' in Deendyal Lal's case. This was adversely commented upon by their Lordships of the Privy Council and the opinion was expressed that there was no justification for the refusal to give to the defendant in the one