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1960 Supreme(Ker) 433

High Court of Kerala
T.C. Raghavan, J.
Arjunan - Appellant
Versus
Narayanan Nair - Respondent
C.R.P. No. 690 of 1959
Decided On : 02-11-1960

The discretion to order security for costs should be exercised more as an exception than as a general rule and only when necessary for the reasonable protection of the interests of the defendant.

Headnote:

Security for Costs - Contract Dispute - The court held that poverty by itself should not be considered as sufficient reason for directing security for the payment of costs. The discretion to order security for costs should be exercised more as an exception than as a general rule and only when necessary for the reasonable protection of the interests of the defendant. In the present case, the court found that the plaintiff's suit was in the nature of a cross suit or cross claim to the defendant's earlier suit, both based on the same contract, and therefore, no security for costs should have been ordered.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff filed a suit for the balance amount due for constructing a building for the defendant. The defendant filed another suit for overdrawn amounts by the plaintiff under the same contract. The defendant filed a petition for security for costs, alleging that the plaintiff possessed no property.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that poverty by itself should not be a sufficient reason for directing security for costs. The discretion to order security for costs should be exercised more as an exception than as a general rule and only when necessary for the reasonable protection of the interests of the defendant. The court also noted that the plaintiff's suit was in the nature of a cross suit or cross claim to the defendant's earlier suit, and therefore, no security for costs should have been ordered.

Issues: The issue was whether the lower court's order directing the plaintiff to furnish security for costs was justified.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that poverty by itself should not be considered as sufficient reason for directing security for the payment of costs. The discretion to order security for costs should be exercised more as an exception than as a general rule and only when necessary for the reasonable protection of the interests of the defendant. Additionally, in cases where the plaintiff's suit is in the nature of a cross suit or cross claim to the defendant's earlier suit, no security for costs should be ordered.

Final Decision: The court allowed the Civil Revision Petition and set aside the order of the lower court. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the petitioner.

ORDER

T.C. Raghavan, J.

1. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 111 of 1958 on the file of the Sub-Court, Trivandrum is the petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition. He entered into a contract to construct a building for the respondent defendant on a site belonging to the defendant. The suit has been laid for the balance amount due to the petitioner for the construction of the building. A few days prior to the filing of the said suit the respondent filed another suit, O.S. No. 683 of 1958, in the court of the Munsiff of Trivandrum for realisation of amounts alleged to have been overdrawn by the petitioner under the same contract. This suit had been transferred to the Subordinate Judge's Court and renumbered as O. S. No. 14 of 1959 to be tried jointly with O. S. No. 111 of 1958. The defendant in O. S. No. 111 of 1958 filed C. M. P. No. 1153 of 1959 for security for costs in the suit under Order XXV Rule 1(1) C. P. C. The only material allegation in the petition was that the plaintiff was possessed of no property and in case the suit was dismissed with costs, it was not possible for the defendant to realise his costs. This allegation not having been seriously controverted in the counter affidavit of the plaintiff, the lower court directed the plaintiff to furnish security for all costs incurred and likely to be incurred in the suit by the defendant. The plaintiff has filed the above Civil Revision Petition against this order.

2. The only reason given by the learned Subordinate Judge for allowing the petition is the apprehension of the defendant that he may not be able to recover his costs in case the suit is dismissed. The learned Judge observes:

"The fear expressed by the defendant is sufficient cause for asking the plaintiff to furnish security for costs."

I do not think that the learned Judge is correct in ordering security for costs for this reason only. In Narasimha Shenoi v Madhava Prabhu (1959 KLJ 333) Kumara Pillai J. had occasion to consider this question and his Lordship adopted the principle laid down by Bowen, L. J. in Cowell v Taylor (1886) XXXI Ch. Dn. 34, as a safe guide for the exercise of discretion tinder Order XXV Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that English case the learned Lord Justice observed that the general rule was that poverty was no bar to a litigant, the exception to this rule being in the case of appeals, where the appellant had the benefit of a decision of one court. I most respectfully adopt the general rule that poverty by itself should not be considered as sufficient reason for directing security for the payment of costs. Under Order XXV Rule 1(1) the court has a discretion in the matter of directing security for costs, except in cases falling within the proviso to the said Rule. That discretion should not be lightly exercised and courts should take care to exercise that power more as an exception than as a general rule and should also see that the power is not exercised unless it is necessary for the reasonable protection of the interests of the defendant. Mere poverty of the plaintiff is not a sufficient reason for exercising that discretion in favour of the defendant.

3. In the present case the position is stronger in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's suit is in the nature of a cross suit or cross claim to the defendant's earlier suit, both being based on the same contract. In such a case the court should be more reluctant to direct security for costs. In New Fenix etc. De Madrid v General Accident etc. Assurance Corporation Ltd. (1911 (2) KB 619) it was laid down that it was for the Court to consider, in the exercise of its discretion, whether, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case, the cross claim must be treated as made, substantially by way of defence to the action or whether it must be regarded as being in the nature of an independent claim made in respect of matters foreign to that action. The latter case may be one for security for costs but in the former secur

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