The duty of a guardian to deal with the property as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would, and acts that are reasonable and proper for the realization, protection, or benefit of the property.

M.S. Menon, J.

1. This is an appeal from the decision of Vithayathil J, in S.A. No. 69 of 1950 of the High Court of Travancore-Cochin after obtaining his declaration that the case is a fit one for appeal under section 21 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, ! 125. Chummar, the appellant before us and in S. A. No. 69 of 1950, was the defendant in O. S. No. 274 of 1121 of the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam. He was also the unsuccessful appellant in A. S. No. 79 of 1123, the appeal from the decision in O. S. No. 274 of 1121 to the District Court of Anjikaimal.

2. The plaintiffs in O. S. No. 274 of 1!21 and the respondents in A. S. No, 79 of 1123, S. A. No. 69 of 1950 and before us are the children of one Lonan who had a leasehold interest created by an oral lease in the item of property specified in the schedule to the plaint. The first plaintiff, Rosa, was a major at the time of the suit. The second and third plaintiffs are still minors. The first plaintiff acts as their guardian.

3. The owner of the property at the time of the oral lease was Chakku, the father of the defendant. Under a family partition on 15-3-1109 (Ext. I) the property was allotted to the defendant. He was a minor at that time, and before he attained majority Chakku acting as his guardian sold the property to one Damodara Pisharody on 29-10-1112 (Ext. D).

4. Lonan continued to be in possession of the property as a lessee until his death. On his death the leasehold right devolved on the respondents and their mother, Ealia, Subsequently, on 14-11-1315, Ealia executed a lease deed, Ext. E, in favour of Damodara Pisharody.

5. After Chummar attained majority he filed O. S. No. 449 of 1117 to set aside the sale in favour of Daraodara Pisharody on the ground that it was prejudicial to his interest and that his father's action as his guardian was not valid or binding. The respondents, all of whom were minors at that time, and their mother were impleaded as defendants in that suit. Ealia filed a written statement on her own behalf and also as the guardian of her minor children. She, however did not do anything further. Chummar succeeded in getting the sale declared invalid (Ext. B).

6. In the appeal filed by Damodara Pisharody, A. S. No. 212 of 1119, the decree of the trial court was reversed (Ext. III). A second appeal by Chummar, S. A. No. 101 of 1120 followed. That ended in a decree setting aside the sale in favour of Pisharody and upholding the right of Chummar to get possession of the property from the respondents and their mother (Judgment: Ext. C, Decree: Ext. VI). The present suit seeks a declaration that the said decree is not binding on the plaintiffs on the ground that their guardian was guilty of gross negligence and a permanent injunction restraining its execution. The trial court and both the appellate courts have come to the conclusion that the decree is not binding on the plaintiffs and that it cannot affect their 5/7th share in the property.

7. The main question agitated before us is as regards the scope and effect of Ext. B, the lease deed executed by Ealia to Damodara Pisharody on 14-11-1115. According to the appellant that document spells a termination of the oral lease and the grant of a fresh demise solely to Ealia who alone figures as a lessee in Ext. E.

8. We propose to assume, without 'deciding, that this contention is correct. Even then, for Ealia's termination of the oral lease to be binding on her minor children, that termination should amount to a beneficial act. They had 5/7th share in the leasehold interest under the oral lease granted to their father, and we find it impossible to say that any giving up of their rights under that lease, with­out payment or apparent reason, was a beneficial act binding on them or their share in the leasehold right.

9. We were told that there were no improvements on the property, that a verumpattom right on the date of Ext. E was only a precarious right, and that the giving up of such a right was a prudent