Thottathil.B.Radhakrishnan, J.

1. Defendants 1 to 3 and 5 in a suit for mandatory injunction and in the alternative for recovery of possession, are the appellants. Plaintiffs sued on the allegation that the first defendant - a partnership firm was permitted to use the plaint schedule property consisting of a building and 56 cents of land for the purpose of conducting timber business and that the said transaction is only a licence which was being renewed from time to time.

2. On the premise that the building and 16.5 cents on which it stands, was governed by the provisions of the Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the plaintiffs filed Ext.A7 rent control petition seeking eviction. Ext.A8 was the objection filed by the first defendant firm. The Rent Control Court dismissed that eviction petition by holding that the transaction was not a building lease as contended in those proceedings and the lease was for the entire extent of 56 cents with building standing thereon and therefore, it is not a building lease for the purpose of Act 2 of 1965. This was affirmed by the appellate authority. That led to a revision before this court at the instance of the plaintiffs in the suit from which this appeal arises. This court affirmed the decision of the appellate authority and the rent control court that the transaction was not a building lease. Nevertheless, this court further dilated on the question whether the transaction between the parties was a lease or licence and held as per Ext.A9 that the transaction was a licence.

3. On the face of the aforesaid finding of this court, the plaintiffs sued for mandatory injunction to direct the first defendant and the partners of the firm to vacate the premises which was covered by the licence. In the alternative, it was contended that if for some reason, the court were to conclude that the transaction is a lease, the plaintiffs may be granted a decree for recovery of possession since any such subsisting lease should also stand terminated.

4. In defence, the plea was that the transaction is not a licence, but a lease of land and that the defendants are entitled to the benefit of Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The court below, after hearing PW1 and DW1 and also taking on record the documents produced, held that the transaction between the parties is essentially a licence and even if it were a lease, the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. This is under challenge.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the court below erred in law in interpreting the provisions contained in Exts.A1 and A6 which are the last among the documents between the parties. According to him, those documents essentially relate to renewal of leases even on nomenclature, and there is no reason, intrinsic or extrinsic, to hold that the transaction is a licence and not a lease. He impeached the finding of the court below that clauses 3, 4 and 10 of Exts.A1 and A6 tend to show that the transaction is only a licence. Contending that the transaction is essentially a lease, it is argued that the lease was only of land for commercial purpose and the mere existence of a building in the land at the time of grant of lease does not, in any manner, deprive the defendants of the benefit of Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. He attempted to distinguish the decision referred to by the court below in support of the proposition that the benefit of Section 106 of the Land Reforms Act would enure only to cases where the lease is of land only and such benefit could not be claimed in relation to a lease of land and building or a lease of land with building.

6. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs, contesting the appeal, argued that the issue relating to Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is squarely covered against the appellants by the decision of the Apex Court in Chandy Varghese v. Abdul Khader (2003(3) KLT 553 (S.C.), which stand