The main legal point established in the judgment is the entitlement of claimants to compensation under the 'no fault' benefit of S.92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, based on the interpretation of the legislative intention and relevant provisions.

K.P. Radhakrishna Menon, J.

1. The petitioners in O.P. 1003/80 in the court of the M.A.C.T. Ernakulam are the appellants. They are the wife and children of one Mohammed Shereef who died in a motor accident which look place on 5-11-1978.

2. The Tribunal after evaluating the evidence adduced by the parties found that the appellants were not able to establish negligence on the part of the third respondent, the driver, and consequently dismissed the petition by judgment dt. 14-6-1982.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the Tribunal was not justified in entering the finding that the evidence adduced by the appellants was not sufficient to establish negligence. The evidence available on record would positively show that the third respondent was negligent, the counsel submits. On going through the records including the judgment appealed against we are of the view that there is little scope to interfere with the said finding because the same cannot be said to be perverse.

4. The learned counsel for the appellants nonetheless advanced an alternative argument that in any event the appellants must be held to be entitled to get the benefit of S.92A of Chap.7A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, introduced in the statute by Act 47/82 with effect from 1-10-1982. S.92A of Chap.7A (corresponding to S.140 of the 1988 M.V. Act), the counsel further submitted, fastens on the owner of the vehicle or as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles, the liability to pay the fixed amount of compensation even if the claimant has not pleaded and established that the death or permanent disablement in respect, of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. The counsel for the Insurance Company however submits that Chap.7A has no retrospective operation and therefore the claim of the appellants for compensation cannot be considered and decided under the provisions contained in this chapter.

5. Before we go into the merits of the above competing contentions we shall refer to a Division Bench ruling of this court construing S.140 of the 1988 M.V. Act (vide United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmavathy (1990 (1) KLT 750). The Division Bench has observed as follows:-

"In effect the Parliament has only retained the same right which was conferred on the victims through Chap.7A of the repealed Act. The difference in the quantum of compensation is only intended to make the right realistic and on a par with the earlier fixed amount. Hence S.6 of the General Clauses Act would not impede the enforcement of S.140 of the New Act in relation to an accident which occurred prior to the coming into force of the New Act. S.6 of the General Clauses Act permits switching over to the repealed Act only if a different intention does not appear in the new statute. Such a different intention can be discerned from the New Act. It is in Chapter of the new Act that provisions regarding "no fault liability" have been included. The chapter starts with S.140 and ends with S.144. The last Section reads as follows: "The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force". The different intention manifested in the New Act is that provisions in Chap.10 should get predominance over all other laws. The provisions contained in that Chapter must be given effect to notwithstanding any contrary provision in any other law including S.6 of the General Clauses Act. All other provisions, therefore, must yield to the provisions contained in Chap.10 of the New Act. This is the legislative intention manifested through S.144 of the New Act".

The Division Bench which rendered the above ruling, had no need to go into the question as to whether S.92-A covers claims for compensation in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person arising out of motor acci