The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of S.106 of the Land Reforms Act, specifically regarding the qualification of a lessee as an assignee entitled to protection from eviction.

G. Balagangadharan Nair, J.

1. Appellant was the defendant in a suit instituted by the respondent for recovery of a small plot of 10 cents (item 1), the removal of a shed (item 2) standing on item 1 and for recovery of rent. The Trial Court granted plaintiff a decree for part of the arrears of rent claimed by her but disallowed the other two reliefs holding that the defendant is entitled to the protection of S.106, Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 ("the Act"). On appeal by the plaintiff the Additional Subordinate Judge granted the plaintiff the reliefs in respect of the land and shed as well and further allowed her the arrears of the rent which had been disallowed by the Munsiff on the ground of limitation.

2. By Ext. A1 dated September 6, 1961 DW 2 who is the defendant's son and one Joseph George who is the latter's brother inlaw took the land (item 1) fora term of 3 years with permission to erect a shed, instal machinery and carry on the business of a saw mill. By an endorsement Ext. A2 dated June 10, 1962 made on Ext. A1 DW 2 and Joseph George surrendered item 1 to ' the plaintiff, even though the term had not expired and assigned their rights in the building (shed) and machinery to the defendant and Varkey Joseph, the father of Joseph George. On the same day the defendant and Varkey Joseph executed a rent deed Ext. A3 taking item 1 for a period of three years. Thereafter the defendant obtained an assignment of the rights of Varkey Joseph in the shed and machinery. On July 15, 1965 the defendant executed a rent deed Ext. A4 to the plaintiff with a term of 3 years from June 10, 1965 when the terms of Ext. A3 expired. It recites that he has purchased the rights of Varkey Joseph in the machinery and shed, that the latter has vacated the premises and retired from the business and that the defendant was therefore executing the rent deed on his own responsibility. On August 21, 1969 the defendant executed an agreement in favour of the plaintiff surrendering the adjacent 61/2 cents which was in his possession as a tenant and agreeing to continue the tenancy over item 1 for three years from June 10, 1968 when the term under Ext. A4 expired and pay the proportionate rent. The plaintiff brought the suit in 1972 for the reliefs mentioned earlier,

3. The defendant resisted the suit contending that he was not liable to surrender the land or to remove the shed and machinery as he was entitled to the benefits under S.106 of the Act, that the amounts claimed in the plaint were not correct and that in any event part of the claim was barred by limitation.

4. The Munsiff upheld the defence under S.106 and found that part of the amounts claimed was barred by limitation. On these findings the plaintiff was given a decree for Rs. 911/- with future interest at 6%. On the appeal taken by the plaintiff the Subordinate Judge denied the defendant the protection of S.106, and found that the amounts disallowed by the Munsiff were not barred by limitation. He thus directed the defendant to remove item No. 2 and to surrender item No. 1 to the plaintiff within three months; in default, allowing the plaintiff to have the shed demolished through court and recover possession of item No. 1 with the incidental expenses. The plaintiff was also allowed to realise Rs. 2800.46 from the defendant on account of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation, with interest at 6%. She was further allowed future rent at the rate of Rs. 60.60 per month from the date of the decree and one half of the costs of the suit.

5. The defendant has preferred the appeal challenging the decision of the appellate Judge against him and the plaintiff has filed a memorandum of cross objections claiming future rent with interest from the date of suit also.

6. The two questions involved in the appeal concern the defendant's claim to immunity from eviction under S.106 and the bar of limitation pleaded by him to part of the arrears of rent. Taking the latter point first as it admits o