Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. Defendants 1 to 4 in a suit for partition are the appellants in this second appeal challenging the preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court, confirmed in first appeal. The first appellant having died during the pendency of the second appeal, appellants 2 to 4 were recorded as her legal representatives.

2. Sri. Ramunni, a Hindu, died intestate on 25-2-1974. His estate is sought to be partitioned. The late first defendant was his widow.- Defendants 2 to 4 are their children. Plaintiff and defendants 5 to 8 are, admittedly, the children of Ramunni through Kallyani, who is not a party to the suit, but examined as P.W. 2.

3. Defendants 1 to 4, the appellants herein, contended that there was no valid marriage between Ramunni and Kallyani and accordingly, the plaintiff and defendants 5 to 8 were the illegitimate children of Ramunni and hence not entitled to succeed to his estate.

4. On the basis of the evidence on record, the Trial Court found that Ramunni and P.W. 2 had undergone the ceremonies of a marriage in 1957. However, it held that the same was void by reason of S.11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), being one in contravention of S.5(i) of that Act, in as much as Ramunni had a spouse living at that time. But, the Trial Court held; that the plaintiff and defendants 5 to 8, the illegitimate children of Ramunni were also entitled to be treated as legitimate and hence entitled to share, in view of S.16 of the Act.

5. During the course of the suit, the plaintiff and defendants 5 to 8 conceded one share to the mother of Ramunni on the ground that he had predeceased her. She had released her such share to defendants 1 to 4.

6. Accordingly, the Trial Court passed a preliminary decree directing that the suit properties be divided into 10 shares and, leaving out 1 share that was conceded to Ramunni's mother's estate, the plaintiff and defendants, 8 in number, were to take a share each. The lower appellate court has confirmed it. Hence this second appeal under S.100 C.P.C. by defendants 1 to 4.

7. I have heard Adv. Sri. V. V. Asokan on behalf of the appellants and Adv . Sri. T. A. Ramadasan, on behalf of the respondents.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 68/1976), hereinafter referred to as 'the Amending Act', came into operation, having, received the assent of the President and published in Gazette of India only on 27-5-1976 and that therefore, the provisions contained in S.16 of the Act, as substituted by the Amending Act, could not apply to confer legitimacy on plaintiff and defendants 5 to 8 to succeed to the estate of Ramunni, who died intestate on 25-2-1974, i.e. before the Amending Act came into operation. It is contended that they are illegitimate children who obtained the status of legitimacy only in 1976, by the effect of the Amending Act, long after succession had opened as regards the estate of Ramunni, upon his death. It is urged that, as far as the estate of Ramunni is concerned, succession opened out upon his death on 25-2-1974 and that it cannot be postponed. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Daya Singh's case, (1974 (1) SCC 700). Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Eapen Chacko's case, 1977 KLT 1, it is urged that while interpreting a statute, rights which are already vested in the parties should be respected. Referring to R. Muthammal's case (AIR 1960 SC 601) and Deo Kishen's case, (1983 ILR (5) All 509) referred to, in R. Muthammal's case, it is pointed out that in similar situations, where disabilities were removed, provisions were held not to affect situations before the coming into force of the statute. It is further urged that the amendment of 1976, to S.16, is not a declaratory legislation and there is no indication in the Amending Act that the Parliament intended to give retrospective operation to the said provisi