K.A. Mohamed Shafi, J.

1. This C.R.P. is filed challenging the common order dated 11.8.2000 in I.A. Nos. 1951 & 1957/1999 in O.S. No. 90/98 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Couft, Mavelikkara.

2. The revision petitioners-defendants in the above suit filed I.A. 1951/99 to set aside he ex parte decree passed against them on 20.8.99 under O. 9 R. 13 C.P.C. and I.A. 1957/99 to condone the delay of 66 days in preferring the application to set aside the ex parte decree under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. The lower court found no ground to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree and accordingly dismissed both the applications. Hence the defendants have preferred this revision before this Court challenging the common order in both the I.As.

3. The counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that the remedy available to the revision petitioners-defendants is to file an appeal against the order dismissing the application to set aside the ex parte decree taking a ground in the appeal regarding the incorrectness of the order passed by the trial court in the application to condone the delay in preferring the petition to set aside the ex parte decree. In support of this contention the counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of this Court in Kunihraman v. Rossy (1979 KLT 718) wherein this Court has held that in cases where petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal is dismissed and the appeal is also dismissed on the ground that it is bared by limitation, proper remedy is to file an appeal against the decree, if it is allowed under law and to take the ground in the appeal that the lower court was wrong in not excusing the delay in filing the appeal. But after considering the various judgments of this Court as well as the various High Court I am unable to subscribe to the above view expressed by the Single Judge of this Court.

4. In the decision in K. virupakshiah v. M. Shivalingaiah (AIR 1960 A.P. 540) a Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court following various decisions of the Madras High Court has observed as follows:

"(5). The question whether, in spite of an applicant's omission to pursue the remedy of appeal, the High Court ought to exercise its discretionary power of interference in revision, obviously depends on the special circumstances of each case. It has been held by courts that it would be proper to interfere in revision where the existence of the alternative remedy is doubtful, or where the alternative remedy is inconvenient or is not efficacious or is barred or where non-interference will lead to multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary expense and delay, or results in grave injustice."

5. In the decision in Kuruvilla v. Rajagopala Iyer (1966 KLT 916) a Single Judge of this Court negativing the contention that if the appeal against the order dismissing the application which amounts to a decree challenging the correctness of the order dismissing the application to condone the delay, has observed as follows:

"14. If this Court is satisfied that the rejection of the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act by the lower court is not justifed, in my opinion, the order of the learned District Judge dismissing the appeal based upon this order will be absolutely void and if the order under attack is set aside the legal consequence will be all those orders, will have no effect in law"

6. In the decision in Subramonia Iyer v. State of Kerala (1967 KLT 210) a Single Judge of this Court has observed as follows:

"The legal position is clear that in a case where there is a right of appeal to a subordinate court but no right of second appeal, the revisional powers of the High Court even against the order of the first court are excluded and that in a case where there is a right of appeal to the lower appellate court and a right of second appeal to the High Court, the revisional powers of the High Court excluded".

7. In the decision in Lakshmikutty Pankickathi v. Bharghavi