The main legal principle established is that absence of leave under Section 446(1) of the Companies Act makes the proceedings voidable, not void, and the court has the power to set aside orders in the interests of justice.

P. Janaki Amma, J.

1. The petitioner in C. R. P. No. 583 of 1980 is M/s. Joshi Trading Company (Pvt.) Ltd., in liquidation, represented by the official liquidator, Bombay High Court. The petition is filed against the order of the subordinate judge, Cochin, allowing execution of the order for eviction passed in R. C. P. No. 27 of 1978 of the Rent Control Court, Cochin.

2. The building involved is owned by the first respondent in C. R. P. No. 583 of 1980, who is the sole respondent in C. R. P. No. 839 of 1980. The building is alleged to have been let to M/s. Joshi Trading Company P. Ltd. on a rent of Rs. 3,000. The petition, R. C. P. No. 27 of 1978, was filed on February 13, 1978 on the ground that the tenant, who was the first respondent therein, defaulted to pay rent from December 1, 1976, and sublet the building to respondents 2 to 4. The fifth respondent in the petition was the official liquidator. Respondents 1 and 5 did not contest the petition. Respondents 2 to 4 filed objections denying the sub-lease and setting up an arrangement under which they had paid rent to the first respondent. The third respondent also contended that the petition was not maintainable without the sanction of the liquidation court. During the pendency of the petition, respondents 2 and 3 entered into a compromise with the petitioner and agreed to an order for eviction of the portion in their possession on condition that they would be given a fresh lease on terms mentioned in the compromise. Since the petitioner confined his claim for an order for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, the question whether there was a sub-lease in favour of respondents 2 to 4 was not gone into. An order for eviction was passed on the ground of arrears of rent.

3. The landlord filed E, P. No. 262 of 1978 in the Munsiff's Court, Cochin, for delivery of the building. Respondents 4 and 5 challenged the order for eviction, on the ground that it had no validity since sanction of the liquidation court had not been obtained as contemplated in Section 446 of the Indian Companies Act. The fifth respondent further contended that the order for eviction was null and void and the court had no jurisdiction to execute the order in view of Section 537 of the Companies Act. The munsiff upheld the objection and held that failure to obtain the previous sanction of the Bombay High Court to initiate the proceedings under Section 446 of the Companies Act, was fatal and, in the absence of sanction, the order for eviction was not executable. The landlord preferred a revision petition before the subordinate judge, Cochin, under Section 14 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The subordinate judge held that there was no necessity for getting the sanction of the company court and, therefore, the order for eviction was liable to be executed. It is this order that is challenged in the two revision petitions.

4. As the contention of the petitioners mainly centres round the scope and applicability of Section 446(1) to the facts and circumstances of the case, it will be advantageous to quote the section. The section reads :

"446. Suits stayed on winding up order.--(1) When a winding up order has been made or the official liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding-up order, shall be proceeded with against the company, except by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose.

(2) The court which is winding up the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of-

(a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company ;

(b) any claim made by or against the company (including claims by or against any of its branches in India);

(c) any application made under Section 391 by or in respect of the company;

(d) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, w