V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.

1. Can the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad validly represent (and thereby bind) his anandiravans in a suit and decree based on a transaction which he himself fobbed off on the family without necessity or benefit ? That is the central problem raised in this appeal and high-lighted in the debate at the bar and my hesitant answer is that he cannot.

2. The plaintiffs have appealed to the High Court from a decree of the Sub Court, Palghat, dismissing their suit for a declaration that another decree (in O.S. No. 43 of 1962 on the file of the same Court), Ext. B-18, is not binding on their tavazhi. That decree was passed in favour of defendants 1 and 2 in enforcement of a mortgage, Ext. B-1, executed in favour of deceased Chamu, their father, by the 3rd defendant on behalf of her son, the 1st plaintiff, and on her own behalf. The mortgage amount is Rs. 11,000 and is made up of sums representing two prior debts of Rs. 760-6-0 and Rs. 5,331-4-0 debts which are not seriously disputed before us and rightly so, and another borrowing, under a promissory note, Ext. B-2, for Rs. 2,000 which had accumulated to Rs. 2,031 plus a cash payment of Rs. 2,921 stated to have been received for tavazhi purposes. The plaintiffs, all of them minors and children of the 3rd defendant and her husband Nataraja Menon, contended that these debts were not binding on their thayazhi both because the purpose was not for the benefit or necessity of the family (but for spendthrift Nataraja Menon's uses) and also because the need to borrow did not exist. The defendant, inter alia, refuted both these grounds and went further to plead that the decree in O.S. No. 43 of 1962 having been passed against the plaintiffs' tavazhi, they were barred from contending that the debts were not binding, without expressly praying for the cancellation of the aforesaid decree and proving sucessfully that the said decree had been vitiated by fraud and collusion. Since there was neither pleading nor proof in this behalf the suit was liable to be dismissed. On this last contention, the ground, taken by the plaintiffs is that the decree in O.S. No. 43 of 1962 does not stand in the way of the reliefs being granted in the present suit if the mortgage debt, in enforcement of which that decree was passed, is shown to be not binding on the family. For, the argument is that a decree obtained against the Kartha or karnavan of a joint family, on a loan or alienation, cannot bind it, if he is also the author of the impugned transaction. The vice of the alienation vitiates the representation in the litigation.

3. The leamed Subordinate Judge inter alia, considered the non-maintainability of the action on the score that the relief sought, was only for a bare declaration, without the consequential or further relief of injunction against the execution of the decree in O.S. No. 43 of 1962 and that therefore section 42 of the Specific Relief Act was a bar. He held, however, that the suit was maintainable and that the decree in O.S. No. 43 of 1962 was "by itself not a bar for the plaintiffs coming forward with the present suit", nevertheless dismissed it. I agree with the lower Court that the 'further relief' contemplated in the provision, understood in the background, of the policy of preventing a multiplicity of suits, covers only those reliefs which flow directly and necessarily from the declaration sought, i.e., reliefs necessarily consequent on and essential for really securing the right asserted. [Vide Munnu Chamar v. Hari Narain (A.I.R. 1947 All. 352).In this sense, the subsidiary claim for an injunction neither furthers nor is necessary to get the benefit of the declaratory, relief. The lower Court's dismissal is based, ultimately, on the holding, which runs as follows:

" So far as the question as to whether there was any legal necessity binding on the tavazhi of the 3rd defendant for any of the earlier debts and whether there was any necessity for borrowing the subsequent am